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CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF RISK AND  
THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS 
Molly J. Walker Wilson*
ABSTRACT
Every year, law-makers and agency regulators, with the input of industry experts 
and scientists, make hundreds of decisions about how to regulate conduct and 
allocate resources to address various types of risks that threaten the well-being of 
American citizens.  In fact, managing and minimizing risk is one of the most 
important tasks of today’s policy-makers.  In spite of this fact, most actions are taken 
without systematic consideration of the preferences of the very people whose welfare 
is at stake.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the dominance of Traditional Risk 
Analysis, with its emphasis on statistics and cost-benefit analysis, has downplayed 
the role of values and subjectivity in risk management.  The result has been that risk 
decisions have been based upon the erroneous assumption that empirical data and 
mathematical calculations alone are adequate bases for risk decisions.  There has 
been virtually no acknowledgment that ex ante consideration of the convictions and 
passions of the public is valuable.  In fact, a number of scholars have argued that 
because individuals become emotional about potential harms, scientific experts 
should make all risk decisions without any public involvement at all.  Another 
consequence of the focus on traditional risk analysis is that no comprehensive model 
of public risk perception has been developed.  Existing theoretical perspectives and 
methodologies have not offered a comprehensive model, and each has suffered from 
limitations of one kind or another.  This Article argues that law makers cannot 
adequately manage risks without understanding how members of the public view and 
react to these risks.  In an effort to provide specific guidance for future risk decisions, 
the Article synthesizes past risk perception research and theory in order to offer a 
comprehensive risk perception model.  This model should serve as a tool for risk 
managers and policy-makers, and a catalyst for future normative risk management 
debate. 
INTRODUCTION
The interaction between risk events and social processes makes it clear that . . 
. risk has meaning only to the extent that it treats how people think about the 
world and its relationships.  Thus, there is no such thing as “true” (absolute) 
and “distorted” (socially determined) risk.  Rather the information system and 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, J.D. University of Virginia, 
Ph.D. M.A. University of Virginia. 
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characteristics of public responses that compose social amplification are 
essential elements in determining the nature and magnitude of risk.1
Risk management decisions are not being made . . . in part because there are 
no clear criteria.2
Each day, Americans live with risk-management laws and policies that 
have been formulated by lawmakers who lack the most basic understanding how 
Americans view and react to these risks.  Although the United States was founded 
on the notion that individual citizens have the fundamental right to govern their 
own existence and make independent informed choices, decisions about how to 
manage national security, pollutants in our water, speed limits, and health and 
safety standards in eating establishments and workplaces, are decided by a few, 
on behalf of many.  The allocation of responsibility for such decisions to a 
particular group of individuals is inevitable; few would argue that every public 
risk decision should be put to a vote of the people.  Nevertheless, decisions about 
how to manage risk—defined as the potential for harm from various sources—are 
inherently value-laden judgment calls.  The very fact that risks are potential 
makes them unknowable, at least with any kind of certainty; their short and long-
term consequences are hard to gauge.  Because it is impossible to address and 
eliminate all risks simultaneously, difficult decisions must be made with respect 
to which pose the most significant threat, and which negative consequences are 
the most terrible.  While expert analysis and prediction can give us best guesses as 
to how future events might unfold, it cannot anticipate human fear, nor can it 
evaluate two harms with equivalent expected costs to determine objectively which 
is worse.  This Article synthesizes past research and theory in the area of 
individual and public risk perception to derive a model of risk perception that may 
serve as a tool for risk managers and law makers in understanding how 
individuals think about, comprehend, and evaluate risks.   
Although daily life and governance3 involve myriad decisions, choices 
about how to respond to risks are some of the most important decisions human 
beings make.  From the homebuyer evaluating the terms of a loan, to the 
lawmaker deciding whether to vote for a declaration of war, individuals make 
risky decisions in a seemingly infinite variety of contexts.  Moreover, when 
evaluating the potential for future harm, the choices we make often have profound 
implications for future outcomes, including those affecting generations to come.  
Human comfort and survival are not the only considerations implicated by our 
choices.  Recently, there has been a growing awareness of how our actions impact 
the earth, air, water sources, and plant and animal life. Risky decisions influence 
1 Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, et al. The Social Amplification of Risk: A 
Conceptual Framework, 8, 2 Risk Analysis 177, 181 (1988).   
2 Paul Slovic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 21 (2000) (hereinafter, “PERCEPTION”). 
3 “Simply put ‘governance’ means “the process of decision-making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented (or not implemented).” See
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited, Aug. 
28, 2010). 
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many facets of life, and involve gauging outcomes that are difficult to predict, 
even with reasonably good data, making the wisdom of any particular course of 
action speculative.  And yet, it is impossible to avoid making these difficult 
choices.  Once a threat has been identified, failure to set a course of action is 
usually a choice in and of itself.   
Although there is an abundance of literature on how risks should be 
measured, managed, controlled, and calculated, surprising little has been written 
on how stakeholders—individuals who are affected by potential harms—evaluate 
and react to potential threats.  When risk management proposals are advanced, 
they are usually presented exclusively in terms of probabilities and costs.  To a 
great extent, factors exogenous to the conscious decision task, such as human 
emotion and cognitive processes, are ignored.  Decision tasks are treated as if 
there is a correct answer upon which all could agree, if only complete data were 
available.  Rarely is risk understood as a culturally defined force, interpreted by 
human beings who bring their own understandings and preferences to the table.  
However, recent empirical and theoretical contributions from sociology, 
psychology, and anthropology make it clear that the very act of perceiving and 
evaluating a danger is a complex, multi-faceted process.  Several theoretical and 
empirical perspectives on risk perception have been offered by influential thinkers 
such as Paul Slovic, Roger Kasperson, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, 
Ulrich Beck, and Mary Douglas, among others.  Nevertheless, research on how 
individuals think about risk has failed to converge on a comprehensive model of 
risk perception.  In part, this failure has arisen because discussions have 
emphasized either the specific characteristics of the risks or the social 
mechanisms underlying public panics.  Analysis of the interaction of these two 
aspects of risk perception is sparse.4  Although each of the various primary 
approaches to investigating and understanding risk perception make important 
contributions, to date, there has not been an attempt to draw wisdom from the 
collective scholarship.5
 This Article synthesizes the collective wisdom from psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, political science, and law, to derive a model that 
includes the most important factors to consider in predicting how members of the 
public will evaluate risks.  A primary aim of this Article is to broaden and deepen 
the scope of our understanding of risk perception by synthesizing various risk 
4 The exception is Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, et al. The Social Amplification 
of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8, 2 Risk Analysis 177 (1988), which is an important work, but 
is subject to a number of shortcomings discussed in Section I, infra.
5 Instead, commentators have attempted to compare and contrast various methodologies and 
theories in an effort to arrive at a consensus as to which of the approaches is most useful.  See e.g.,
Claire Marris, Ian H. Langford, & Timothy O’Riordan, A Quantitative Test of the Cultural Theory 
of Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm, 18 Risk Anal., 635, 635 
(1998)(finding that “The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm 
explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases”); see 
also Lennart Sjöberg , Are Received Risk Perception Models Alive and Well? 22 Risk Anal. 665 
(2002) (arguing that recent scholarship touting cultural and psychometric risk analysis approaches 
have been inappropriately optimistic about the approaches). 
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perception theories.  Ultimately, the goal is to create a single set of criteria that 
can be used to understand when, and under what conditions, human beings 
become concerned about particular risks.  The hope is that this model will serve 
as a tool for risk managers and a  springboard for future normative discussion of 
public risk management.6
 The Article proceeds in four parts.  Section I begins by describing the 
current risk climate, noting the rising concern over modern risks created by 
advances in science and technology.  Section II explains the primary contributions 
to the risk perception literature, examining each of the major theoretical 
perspectives to date.  Section III draws on these existing perspectives to derive a 
list of the most important considerations for risk perception, and introduces 
several new contributions.  Section IV addresses the major considerations from 
Section III, synthesizing the major work from Section II in order to provide a 
comprehensive model that includes risk-amplifying and attenuating factors.7
I. THE NATURE OF MODERN RISKS: WHY WE WORRY
 Policy makers and individual Americans make risk decisions on a daily 
and sometimes even minute-to-minute basis.  It is impossible to think about 
crime, the environment, food safety, foreign relations, medical research, consumer 
protection, traffic laws, economic policy or food production without also thinking 
about risk.8  So much of law and policy is driven by current wisdom regarding 
potential sources of harm, that much of the time, threat containment 
considerations are implicit in the debate.  Risk decisions are never value neutral; 
they are determined by preferences, shaped by affective reactions, and influenced 
by cognitive and cultural biases, although that is not always acknowledged.  
Engaging in the metacognition necessarily in order to understand human threat 
responses can be uncomfortable.  Arguably, this uneasiness explains why so much 
of risk analysis relies on formulaic cost-benefit analysis, while avoiding 
fundamental questions about how our risk responses satisfy human emotional and 
intellectual requirements.   
 In addition to psychological obstacles, fluctuations in the risk landscape 
cause challenges to risk managers and the lay public alike.  The most significant 
6 The Model appears in the Appendix, at the end of the Article. 
7 The notion that risk can be amplified and attenuated was most prominently featured in the 
seminal paper authored by Roger Kasperson and colleagues, entitled, The Social Amplification of 
Risk: A Conceptual Framework, supra note 4. 
8 See John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 102 
TOXICOLOGY 29, 33-35 (1995) (explaining that carcinogens traditionally have been seen to lack 
safety "thresholds," and describing how this no-threshold view prompted regulatory agencies to 
adopt "individual risk" tests); See Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk 
Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK 283, 284 (1995) ("[O]ver 300 of about 5,000 
chemicals routinely used in industry have been labeled carcinogens as a result of animal studies."); 
see also, Frewer, L. J., Scholderer, J., & Bredahl, L., Communicating abou the Risks and Benefits 
of Genetically Modified Foods: The Mediating Role of Trust 23, 6 Risk Analysis (2003).  
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obstacles facing human beings have changed over time as our resources and 
technologies have evolved.  As Paul Slovic has pointed out: 
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear 
technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic 
and long-lasting damage to the earth and the life forms that inhabit it. 
The mechanisms underlying these complex technologies are unfamiliar 
and incomprehensible to most citizens. Their most harmful consequences 
are rare and often delayed, hence difficult to assess by statistical analysis 
and not well suited to management by trial-and-error learning.9
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck notes that we have moved from a culture of 
scarcity to a culture of risk.10  Today, in western societies, more people than ever 
before have their basic needs met.11  Since the early 1900s, an increase in 
resources devoted to researching and developing medicines, methods of food 
production, and novel synthetics have dramatically increased the standard of 
living for most.12 In the United States, citizens benefit tremendously from 
innovative technologies, some of which not only improve the quality of life, but 
also extend our lives and improve our health.  However, these technologies come 
with associated risks, some of which are devastating, and many of which are not 
discovered until after a technology has gained general acceptance and widespread 
use.  The focus has shifted from concern about a lack of resources, to the 
promulgation of dangers in medicines, food sources, the environment, and 
consumer products.13  America, along with other western cultures, has arguably 
become risk-obsessed.14  Commentators have noted the prevalence of fear in our 
culture.15  Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky has famously remarked, “How 
extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best protected, most resourceful 
9 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 280 (1987) (hereinafter Perception II). 
10 Ulrich Beck, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 26 (1992). 
11 See Kenneth E. Boulding, Michael Kammen, & Seymur Martin Lipset, From Abundance to 
Scarcity: Implications for the American Tradition, THE HAMMOND LECT. SER. (1878)(stating that,
“the developed countries of North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia clearly consume 
considerably more than half of these resources, but they have less than a quarter of the world's 
population.”) 
12 See Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the late 1990’s: Is 
Information Technology the Story?, 14 J. of Econ. Persp. 3, 4 (2000). 
13 See Beck, supra note 9, at 19 (suggesting that the “contribution to productivity growth from the 
use of information technology- including computer hardware, software, and communication 
equipment- surged in the second half of the 1990s.”)
14 See David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38 
Sociological Q. 647, 664 (1997)(“The perception of many is that life is very problematic, 
dangerous, and demanding of extreme measures to protect us. Indeed one of the few things 
Americans seem to share is the popular culture that celebrates danger and fear as entertainment 
organized with canned formats delivered through an inexpensive and invasive information 
technology. Private life is closer to public concerns and issues than ever before. This is because 
both wear the look of popular culture. And this looks like fear.”) 
15 See generally, Aaron Cohl, ARE WE SCARING OURSELVES TO DEATH?: HOW PESSIMISM,
PARANOIA, AND A MISGUIDED MEDIA ARE LEADING US TOWARD DISASTER (1997); 
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civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its 
way to becoming the most frightened.”16
If Americans seem paralyzed with fear, it may be because of the nature of 
the risks we face today.  Increasingly, the American populace perceives that it is 
at risk from an onslaught of potential dangers that threaten health and well-
being.17  Whereas famine, disease, and natural disasters plagued past generations 
of human beings, today’s populations face increasingly diverse threats.  The 
development of myriad novel technologies, along with often lagging 
understanding of the full complement of accompanying consequences means that 
society is often fully engaged with a product or process before discovering its 
risks.18 Threats to health and well-being are often difficult to detect, being 
invisible to the naked eye, odorless, and tasteless, or originating in a distant 
location.19   Moreover, the impact of some of the harms we face today, such as 
nuclear weapons and environmental degradation, are profound and far-reaching—
to the next generation and beyond.20  Beck notes that “in the modernization 
process, more and more destructive forces are being unleashed, forces before 
which the human imagination stands in awe.”21  The evolution of science and 
technology, and our shifting focus from production of goods to protection of 
health and environment, has brought a new awareness of risk in individuals.  
Individuals are more aware of risks, think more about them, engage in more self-
education, have more opinions about them, are more emotionally and financially 
invested in managing risk, and therefore desire to and ought to have an increasing 
role in deciding how large-scale risk decisions are made.  
Given our culture of anxiety, continuing in our current state of relative 
ignorance about how members of society perceive risk will have at least two 
negative consequences.  First, as things stand, law and policy makers are seriously 
flawed in their predictions about how members of the public will react to risks.  
The result is that the public is increasingly disenchanted with government, 
distrustful of industry, and scornful of politicians’ reassurances.  Disillusionment 
has a variety of negative consequences, ranging from apathy at the polls to civil 
16 Aron Wildavsky, No risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 Am. Scientist 32, 32 (1979). 
17 See PUBLIC OPINION 2 (1987). This data is clearly outdated, but more recent data suggests a 
continuing trend in a similar direction.  
18 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280. 
19 See Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and Attenuation of 
Risk, 545 Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science 95, 96 (1996). 
The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer 
contaminate the risk experience, which, instead, now involved 
negotiating a new and perplexing array of global threats associated with 
modern armaments, chemicals and radiation often invisible to the 
senses, contaminants whose effects surface only after decades or 
generations, hazards created by peoples and technologies in distant part 
of the globe, and harms arising from the flow and control of 
information. 
20 See Beck, supra note 9, at 19  (“Atomic accidents are accidents no more in the limited sense of 
the word ‘accident’.  They outlast generations.”) Id. (internal parenthetical omitted.) 
21 Id. at 19. 
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unrest.  Moreover, distrust of the various decision-making bodies entrusted with 
the safety and well-being of the citizenry results in fear, and a fearful public is 
more easily manipulated and controlled by actors who use divisive and 
destructive tactics.   The second implication of maintaining the ignorance about 
risk perception is that without input from members of the public, decisions made 
for members of the public will be inevitably flawed.22  Risk calculations—such as 
which benefits are outweighed by which risks—are judgment calls, and are 
invariably subjective.  Accordingly, decisions by a few on behalf of many, 
without consideration for the preferences of those affected, is a form of tyranny.  
Good governance requires inclusivity. 
Some have argued that the public is ill equipped to make valid 
assessments about risk because average citizens are prone to cognitive error and 
bias.23  Law scholar Donald Hornstein strenuously rejects this argument as a basis 
for limiting the role of the public in risk decisions.  Hornstein points out that 
scientists themselves are subject to inevitable uncertainties, flawed methods, and 
industry bias.24  He further argues that subordination of public views to 
governmental risk assessments is undemocratic.  Finally, Hornstein stresses that 
there is a rational basis for citizens’ risk evaluations;  even where they might not 
comport with statistical probabilities, they reflect legitimate personal 
preferences.25
II. CURRENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RISK RESPONSE
 The comprehensive model of risk perception offered in this Article draws 
on the major risk perception theories developed thus far.26  These theories or 
methodologies include traditional risk analysis, psychometric study of risk 
perception, social amplification of risk theory, availability cascade theory, and the 
cultural evaluator theory.  Each theoretical perspective adds an important set of 
considerations, and is worthy of inclusion in the final model.  The oldest and most 
influential approach is traditional risk analysis.  This approach is distinctly expert-
centered, relies upon statistical and mathematical calculations, and involves cost-
benefit analysis.27  More recently, the psychometric method—an individual-
22 The argument that personal preferences about risk have value and must be part of the risk 
decision quotient is made in substantially greater detail in Section III, infra. 
23 That members of the public are prone to mistakes during decision tasks is a theme of law 
scholar Cass Sunstein’s work, as manifest in the article by Kuran and Sunstein referenced below 
(see note 27, supra). 
24 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative 
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 610-16 (1992). 
25 Id. at 610-16.  This view is similar to that of Dan Kahan’s, which is detailed below. See note 
102, supra and accompanying text; see also, Section II. E. supra, and accompanying text. 
26 See Appendix.
27 Cost-benefit analysis can be defined as “a strategy for choice in which weightings are allocated 
to the available alternatives, arriving at some kind of aggregate figure for each major option.” 
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 169, 192 (Matthew D. Adler 
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centered approach to risk evaluation—was pioneered by Baruch Fischhoff, Paul 
Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein.28  These scholars, along with their colleagues, 
solicited the opinions of ordinary Americans regarding various sources of risk, 
and attempted to make generalizations about what characteristics of risk cause 
people particular concern.  A decade after the seminal psychometric paper, Roger 
Kasperson joined with Ortwin Renn, Slovic, and several others to develop a new 
model that included the dynamic processes of risk communication and 
interpretation.  The result, Social Amplification of Risk (SAR), predicted that 
individuals would experience increasing (amplifying) or decreasing (attenuating) 
concern, depending upon potential for events to trigger concern over possible 
future harm.  A related, but fundamentally normative explanation of risk 
perception advanced by Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, explained public panics 
as a result of availability cascades.29  Availability cascades, according to Kuran 
and Sunstein, result when cognitively available (easily accessible) examples of an 
outcome lead people to overestimate the prevalence of a risk or the likelihood of a 
negative outcome.  Social discourse can exacerbate this phenomenon, creating a 
“snowball” effect that results in growing concern among members of the public.  
Kuran and Sunstein use their theory to call for a smaller role for the public in risk 
management, and to advocate for an even larger role for the expert in risk 
decisions.  Dan Kahan’s Cultural Evaluator Model, on the other hand, draws on 
the work of Mary Douglas, who viewed emotional (ie, non-rational) reactions to 
risk as manifestations of culturally shaped (and valuable) expressions of 
underlying world views.  Kahan, like Hornstein, advocates a greater role for 
individual preferences in risk management.  Each of these theoretical perspectives 
is discussed in more detail below.s 
A. Traditional Risk Analysis 
 The most influential approach to risk management has been and remains 
traditional risk analysis.  This broad influence of this expert-centered, data-driven 
methodology is one reason why the role of public opinion in formal risk 
management has been marginalized.  Traditional risk analysis (also referred to as 
“risk management”) can be defined as “the identification, assessment, and 
prioritization followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to 
minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate 
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).  See also, Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, 
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1153, 1153 (2000)(“The term 
‘cost-benefit analysis’ has a variety of meanings and uses. At the highest level of generality, it is 
virtually synonymous with welfare economics, that is, economics used normatively—used, that is, 
to provide guidance for the formation of policy, either public (the more common domain of the 
term) or private.”)(internal citation omitted). 
28 See Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A 
Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits 9 Pol. Sci. 127, 128 
(1978). 
29 Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 683,703 (1999). 
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events.”30 Traditional risk analysis has been used widely, and applied to gauge 
risk in the areas of business enterprise, systems management; insurance; health 
epidemics; and military operations, to name a few.  Depending upon the project or 
set of circumstances, the goals may vary somewhat, although the method tends to 
be consistent.31  Within this methodology, attempts have been made to create 
universal, international standards by which risk can be assessed and managed.32
Traditional risk analysis has been conceived of as a method for determining an 
appropriate response on a large-scale to wide-spread or catastrophic risk33
Traditional risk analysis has relied on a purportedly value-neutral formula: 
[probability of risk occurring] x [cost associated with that risk event].34  The 
formula-based approach focuses largely on hazards related to new technologies, 
environmental degradation, and public health.35  It was, and still is, “distinctly 
‘expert-centered’ and uncomfortable with (or even hostile to) considering the 
views of diverse, nonexpert parties.”36  Risks are defined as the chance of 
physical harm (to person, property, or element of the natural world) due to 
technologies, diseases or other mechanisms.37  This definition excludes explicit 
consideration of affect or value-based reactions to risk.  
Traditional risk analysis is not without its critics.  Some of the criticism 
has focused on the method’s overreliance on basic methods and formulas that lack 
predictive power.38  However, there is a more fundamental issue, relating to the 
30 See generally, Douglas Hubbard, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT'S BROKEN AND 
HOW TO FIX IT (2009). 
31 The methodology involves the following steps: (1) identify, characterize, and assess threats; (2) 
assess the vulnerability of critical assets (3) determine the consequences (i.e., the risk); (4) identify 
ways to reduce those risks; and (5) prioritize risk reduction measures based on a strategy. See, 
Committee Draft of ISO 31000 Risk Management, International Organization for Standardization 
(2009)(on file with author).
32 For example, the International Organization for Standardization has codified a family of 
standards relating to risk called ISO 31000. The purpose of ISO 31000:2009 is to provide 
principles and generic guidelines on risk management. Id. 
33 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004) 
(advocating the use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to catastrophic 
risk).   
34 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at  2.  The formula parallels one side of the 
well-know Coase Theorem, expressed as B < PL, and famously cited by Judge Learned Hand of 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in his decision, United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 
169 (2d. Cir. 1947).  The Coase Theorem represents an efficiency equation, where B is the burden 
of prevention, P is the probability of loss, and L is the cost of the loss.  Optimal efficiency is 
reached when prevention is taken only if the cost of prevention is less than PL.  Importantly, this 
formula works when the losses are pecuniary.  Important ethical considerations arise when the 
losses involve human life or health. Id.
35 See Gary E. Machlis & Eugene A Rosa, Desired Risk: Broadening the Social Amplification of 
Risk Framework, 10 Risk Anal. 161, 161 (1989) (arguing that one important—but oft neglected—
aspect of risk behavior is that of risks that are freely assumed). 
36 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex. Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment 
Battlefied, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 59, 59 (1997) 
37 See Beck, supra note 9, at 4 (from Scott Lash & Brian Wynne, Introduction).  
38 See e.g., Douglas Hubbard, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT'S BROKEN AND HOW 
TO FIX IT 46 (2009).
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inputs; traditional risk analysis gives little or no consideration to the human 
element; it either ignores or substantially underemphasizes public sentiment 
regarding potential threats.39  This feature of risk analysis means that 
policymakers are (1) unable to predict how members of society will view specific 
dangers as the threats become salient to the public (2) ill equipped to craft 
responses to risk that take into account public fear of these hazards.40  In other 
words, as Kasperson, Renn, and Slovic have noted, “the technical concept of risk 
is too narrow and ambiguous to serve as the crucial yardstick for policy 
making.”41  Beck similarly worries that “as long as the debate is “conducted 
exclusively or dominantly in the terms and formulas of natural science” the 
danger exists that the “terms will inadvertently include human beings in the 
picture only as organic material . . . it runs the risk of atrophying into a discussion 
of nature without people, without asking about matters of social and cultural 
significance.”42
Another layer of complexity in this discussion stems from the fact that 
harms often accompany technologies, processes, or products that have important 
benefits.  The value placed on these benefits can fluctuate, so that even if the 
evaluation of associated benefits and harms stays constant, tolerance for the risk 
may change.  Particularly as novel technologies develop, making other 
technologies obsolete, this balance of benefit and harm is ever evolving.  This 
aspect of modern risk analysis is another reason why some have argued that the 
relative risk of various technologies is not appropriately determined exclusively 
by risk experts, who may not have a clear sense for the current value of a 
particular technology to the public at large.43
B. Psychometric Study of Risk Perception 
39 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 177.   
40   Proposed characteristics of effective risk management have attempted to account for the 
human element, but only in a reactive, rather than a responsive and interactive fashion. 
(1) Risk management should create value. 
(2) Risk management should be an integral part of organizational processes. 
(3) Risk management should be part of decision making. 
(4) Risk management should explicitly address uncertainty. 
(5) Risk management should be systematic and structured. 
(6) Risk management should be based on the best available information. 
(7) Risk management should be tailored. 
(8) Risk management should take into account human factors. 
(9) Risk management should be transparent and inclusive. 
(10) Risk management should be dynamic, iterative and responsive to change. 
(11) Risk management should be capable of continual improvement and enhancement. 
See Committee Draft of ISO, supra note 30. 
41 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 178. 
42 Beck, supra note 9, at 24.  Although some cost-benefit risk analysts who have traditionally 
focused on economic issues have started to raise relevant questions about risk perception and 
preferences,  they have done little to answer these questions.  See Ian Savage, An Empirical 
Investigation into the Effects of Psychological Perceptions on the Wiling-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6 
J. of Risk and Uncertainty 75, 76 (1993). 
43 See Section I. E., infra (for a discussion of the cultural evaluator theory of risk perception). 
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 The psychometric study of risk was a response to the predominant method 
employed by traditional risk analysis, known as risk-benefit analysis, which is 
based upon cost-benefit analysis, but is specific to risk management.  Risk-benefit 
is a method of analysis that asks “Is this product (activity, technology) acceptably 
safe? Alternatively, how safe is safe enough?”44  Baruch Fischhoff along with 
Paul Slovic and colleagues believed that the risk-benefit analysis was inadequate 
for answering those questions.45 Specifically, they took issue with the "revealed 
preference" theory of risk-benefit analysis, which assumes that through trial and 
error, society has determined an optimum level of risk for a given activity.46   The 
primary criticism of psychometric analysis is that it ignores the fact that society’s 
preferences fluctuate. 47 “Revealed preferences” also assumes that the market 
correctly reflects optimal risk level and it discounts the possibility that the public 
is accepting a risk because it is ignorant of the potential for harm or the potential 
for elimination of harm.48
In response to the perceived weaknesses of this method of risk analysis, 
Fischoff  and colleagues proposed a surprisingly little-used method of 
ascertaining the “acceptability” of risk— they asked people questions.49  The goal 
was to derive a “cognitive map”50 or a taxonomy for hazards that could serve as a 
tool for understanding and predicting risk responses.51  Psychometric researchers 
hoped to explain “people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to 
others, and the discrepancies between these reactions and opinions of experts.”52
The initial method and the results were presented in a 1978 empirical paper.  
Although the methodology was not without drawbacks,53 the work represented a 
breakthrough in risk analysis, turning focus toward the perceptions and priorities 
of members of the public, rather than focusing exclusively on formulas or experts 
to determine acceptable risks and risk levels. 
C.  The Social Amplification of Risk Theory
If the psychometric study of risk perception was a breakthrough, the 
“social amplification of risk” theory advanced the field further, building on the 
previous work by adding social, cultural, and other dynamic aspects of risk 
perception to the equation. 54  In 1988, Roger Kasperson and his colleagues 
44 See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 27.  
45 The work with which Fischhoff, Slovic, and colleagues took issue is Chauncey Starr Social 
Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165, Science, 1232 (1969). 
46 Id..
47 See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, et al. supra note 27, at 129.  
48 See id. at 128. 
49 See id. at 127. 
50 See Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2, at 222. 
51 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 287. 
52 Id.
53 For example, the respondents were all women, and were all members of the League of Women 
voters.  For a variety of reasons, this group is not likely to be representative of society as a whole. 
54 See generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4. 
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introduced the novel framework, which sought to describe active and interactive 
forces through which risk perceptions are amplified and attenuated.55  Social 
amplification of risk (SAR) included additional influences not accounted for by 
traditional risk analysis.  Like the psychometric model, SAR accounts for 
characteristics of a hazard that influence the public’s response to risk, including 
whether the risk is assumed voluntarily, familiarity with the source of the danger, 
and the potential for catastrophe.56  In addition, SAR includes consideration of 
cultural factors, such as those affecting the priorities and agendas of various 
societal subgroups, the associated efforts to influence risk responses, and social 
aspects, such as the impacts of information communication.57  Hence, SAR is 
concerned with more than cost-benefit analysis or individual preference; this 
theory includes factors that implicate ethical and normative considerations. 
The SAR concept envisions a flexible feedback system in which social 
perceptions of risks influence behaviors which then impact responses to risk, 
which in turn influence the public’s view of the risk.58  In addition to the more 
comprehensive framework provided by SAR, the theory makes several 
particularly valuable contributions to the field of risk analysis.  In short, SAR 
posits that “risk events interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes 
in ways that can heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk 
behavior . . . [and that] behavioral patterns in turn generate secondary social or 
economic consequences . . . [and] may act also to increase or decrease the physical 
risk itself.”59
1. Amplification Mechanisms 
SAR identifies “amplification stations” and steps whereby, either through 
direct experience, or more commonly, by learning from other sources, individuals 
develop heightened sensitivity to various risks.60  Kasperson et al. describe this 
process at several levels.  At the message level, SAR parses the communication 
into factual information, inferential messages, and conclusions, the formation of 
which depend upon which cultural symbols and values are implicated.61  In 
addition to the content of the message, the number of times the message is 
55 Id. 
56 Id. See Machlis & Rosa, supra note 22, at 164.  
57 .See generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4; See also, Arie Rip, Should Social 
Amplification of Risk  be Counteracted? 8,2 Risk Analysis 193, 196 (1988).  
58 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178 The authors admit that other scholars have 
written in a less comprehensive fashion about the dynamic social aspect of risk analysis.  See B. 
Wynne, Public Perceptions of Risk, in Surrey, J. (ed.) 246-259 THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION OF 
IRRADIATED FUEL (1984); see also generally, B. Johnson & V. Covello, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RISK (1987). 
59 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 178. See also, Nick Pidgeon, Risk 
Communication and the Social Amplification of Risk : Theory, Evidence,and Policy Implications,
4 Risk Decision and Policy 145, 146 (1999);  
60 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 184; See also, Pidgeon, supra note 59, at 
147 (1999);  
61 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 180.   
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repeated may affect judgments about accuracy.62  At the signal level, scientists, 
the media, political organizers, public agencies, and other interested individuals 
and groups generate and communicate information about the potential for harm.63
Recipients of the information filter and decode the signals they receive and 
ultimately interpret and often communicate that information to others, forming 
conclusions in the process.64
2. Secondary and Third-order Impacts 
Once recipients have interpreted the information, bringing personal 
experience and value judgments to bear in the process, they manifest behavioral 
responses.  These responses can involve attempts to change the status quo, 
including pressuring policy makers; altering personal behavioral patterns; 
communicating attitudes to others in the community; and engaging in related 
consumer behavior.65  These behavioral responses result in secondary impacts, 
which according to Kasperson and colleagues include impacts on business sales, 
modifications in training of emergency personnel, protesting or other forms of 
social unrest, changes in regulatory standards, and political and social pressure.66
3. Information Channels 
In addition to describing outcomes, social amplification theory also seeks to 
explain the characteristics of information flow, and how patterns of social 
exchange and the very nature of communication can impact perceptions of risk.  
SAR identifies four aspects of communication about risk that can affect risk 
judgments: the volume of information about the risk, the degree to which the 
information is controversial, the sensationalistic nature of the information, and the 
“symbolic connotations” inherent in the information.67  Several of these 
characteristics implicate certain previously discussed so-called amplification 
stations.  For example, the media’s interest in a particular risk is likely to result in 
repeated, highly sensationalized reports, increasing the public’s attention to the 
risk.68
Social amplification theory is primarily focused on risk amplification, but the 
theory does provide some insight into factors that will tend to result in risk 
62 Id. See also, See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. See also, Pidgeon, supra note 
59, at 147 (1999);  
63 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 181.  
64 Id. 
65 Id.
66 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 , at 182; See also, Pidgeon, supra note 59, at 
147(explaining that some events will lead to spreading “ripples” of secondary consequences which 
go beyond the initial impact of the event); See also, Machlis & Rosa, supra note 22, at 163.  
67 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 184.   
68 See id. (pointing out that repeated coverage of a particular hazard can result in public “scares”).   
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attenuation.69  One example is an individual’s direct, personal experience with a 
particular risk.  Although direct experience can serve to amplify risk judgments, 
such as when a hazard leaves an indelible memory because of its vivid nature, 
amplification is not the only possible result of direct experience.70  Familiarity 
with a risky activity can sometimes result in statistically low risk calculations, as 
is the case when drivers are asked the likelihood of serious injury or death 
resulting from the operation of an automobile.71
4. Features of the Social Environment 
Finally, recipients of information about risks have characteristics that help to 
determine how the information will be received and processed.  For example, 
human beings are limited in their ability to process information.  As a result, they 
rely on cognitive rules of thumb, or heuristics, when they process information.72
Although the use of heuristics is often helpful, it can also result in misleading or 
biased judgments.73  Cultural values, like heuristics, shape the lens through which 
information is evaluated and assimilated, helping to determine which dangers are 
given high priority.74  Timing becomes important when the political landscape 
encourages posturing around real or perceived dangers to public welfare.  When 
subgroups within society hold opposing views on issues, SAR theory predicts that 
“a risk . . . will be vigorously brought to more general public attention . . . [and 
p]olarization of views and escalation of rhetoric by partisans typically occur and 
new recruits are drawn into the conflict.”75  Kasperson et al. also claim that the 
“signal” sent by a risk event and the “stigma” associated with certain locations or 
processes can influence risk perception.76
69 William J. Burns, Paul Slovic, Roger E. Kasperson, Jeanne X. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, & 
Srinivas Emani, Incorporating Structural Models into Research on the Social Amplification of 
Risk: Implications for Theory Construction and Decision Making 13, 6 Risk Analysis 611 
(1993)(developing structural models to explain how the impact upon society of an accident is 
influenced by several factors including the physical consequences of the event, perceived risk, 
media coverage, and public response). 
70 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18 at 96. 
71 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 184 (“Generally, experience with dramatic 
accidents or risk events increases the memorability and imaginability of the hazard, thereby 
heightening the perception of risk.  But direct experience can also . . . afford . . . better perspective 
and enhanced capacity for avoiding risks.” Id.
72 Heuristics and biases are discussed in greater detail in Section II, infra. 
73 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982)). 
74 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185.  An example of just such a value is the 
notion that society’s children, because they are uniquely vulnerable members of society and 
because they are the “future” or our civilization, are worthy of special protection.  This sentiment 
would result in a higher level of concern over risks that could negatively impact young members 
of society. 
75 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185. 
76 The inclusion of “signal value” and “stigmatization”, while helpful and relevant to predicting 
and understanding public reactions to risk, do not fit particularly well under the rubric of social 
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This type of polarization and galvanization around an issue or event is a 
typical phenomenon in politics, and particularly in our two-party system.  
Discontent over the state of the economy, financial markets, the housing market, 
and unemployment generally, caused deep divisions following a series of events 
occurring between 2007 and 2010.  The precipitous fall of the housing market, 
starting in 2006,77 proved disastrous for countless Americans, many of whom lost 
their jobs and ultimately their homes in the ensuing financial meltdown.78
According to the social amplification of risk theory, the economic downturn 
served as a signal, shaping how Americans viewed subsequent events.  
Subsequent events, such as the government bailout of struggling financial 
institutions, the implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program79 (signed 
into law by U.S. President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008), the election of 
Barack Obama to the presidency one month later, and Obama’s subsequent push 
for healthcare reform were evaluated in terms of the on-going crisis, fueling the 
anxiety of those already apprehensive about threats to their financial security.  
With fear as a powerful catalyst, citizens became increasingly nervous and 
divided.  As noted by the Pew Research Center in April, 2010, “(b)y almost every 
conceivable measure Americans are less positive and more critical of government 
these days. The Pew survey concluded that “a perfect storm of conditions 
associated with distrust of government—a dismal economy, an unhappy public, 
and bitter partisan-based backlash—resulted in epic discontent with Congress and 
elected officials.”80
D. Availability Cascade Theory 
What explains widespread fixations on unthreatening waste dumps, 
nearly harmless chemicals, and unlikely causes of a tragic airplane crash, 
when for years on end far more serious health hazards, such as breast 
cancer, indoor air pollution, “junk food” consumption, and asthma in the 
inner city have commanded comparatively little attention?81
environmental factors.  Ambiguity in how to categorize various SAR factors is one drawback of 
the theory.  
77 According to one report: “A variety of experts now say, the housing industry appears to be 
moving from a boom to something that is starting to look a lot like a bust.” Jeremy W. Peters, 
Sales Slow for Homes New and Old. N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/business/26home.html?_r=1&oref=login&ref=business&pag
ewanted=print (last visited, Aug. 27, 2010). 
78 See, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression
REUTERS, February 29, 2009, found at, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227 (last 
visited, Aug. 28, 2010). 
79 For more on TARP, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm (last visited, 
Aug. 27, 2010). 
80 Press Release, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, The People and Their 
Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger, and Partisan Rancor (April 18, 2010) 
(found at: http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf, last visited, Aug. 24, 2010). 
81 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28 at 703.  
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This is the question Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein posed more than a 
decade after Kasperson et al. published their initial paper on social amplification 
of risk.  The answer, according to Kuran and Sunstein is availability cascades.82
Kuran and Sunstein based their notion of availability cascades on the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky, who described the availability heuristic twenty-five years 
earlier.83  The availability heuristic was described by Kahenman and Tversky as 
operating in “situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind. This judgmental heuristic is called availability.”84  The 
availability heuristic has gained traction in legal scholarship, and is defined as a 
widely-used mental shortcut that leads people to assign a higher likelihood to 
events that are readily “available,” which is to say those that are particularly likely 
to come to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.85
82 Although the first published paper containing an extensive discussion of availability cascades 
was Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28), several other 
law review articles referenced the concept in 1998, citing to the Kuran & Sunstein paper as a work 
in progress: see e.g., Cass. R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175  
(1997); see also, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler , A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); see also, Cass R. Sunstein, How Law 
Constructs Preferences, 86 Geo. L.J. (1998). 
83 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974) (introducing “availability” along with other heuristics and biases).  
See also, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). For some early law review pieces discussing heuristical 
processing and responses in legal frameworks, see Mark G. Kelman et al., Imperfect Information 
in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 1387, 1436-42 (1983) (discussing the availability and representative heuristics); Barbara D. 
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and 
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L. J. 1408 (1979) (“Studies show that in making 
individualized judgments people rely primarily on information about the case at hand, paying 
relatively little attention to background information about other cases.”).  
84 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note at 83, at 1127. 
85 I will have a great deal more to say about the availability heuristic at a later point in this Article.  
The characteristics (frequency, recency, and vividness) that have been demonstrated to increase 
cognitive availability (or make specific examples more memorable) have important implications 
for determining when risk communication is likely.  The availability heuristic therefore becomes 
central in formulating a predictive model of risk communication and perception.  For more on the 
availability heuristic, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 683-91;Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 
supra note 82 at 1519; see also, Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational 
Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 270-71 (Francesco Parisi & 
Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); see also, Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1091 (2000); see also, Justin Pidot, The Applicability of Nuisance Law to Invasive 
Plants: Can Common Law Liability Inspire Government Action?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 222-
23 (2005); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and 
Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005)[hereinafter, Sunstein, 
Precautions]. 
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The primary claim of Kuran and Sunstein is that in certain instances, the 
availability heuristic is perpetuated and enlarged by certain social mechanisms 
that serve to reinforce widespread, erroneous risk judgments.86  Availability 
cascades occur when information about potential harms travels through social 
communication channels, and a prevailing wisdom is created and reinforced.87
The process occurs when “expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual 
responses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their 
rising availability in public discourse.”88  The motivations behind these cascades 
may be information or reputational.89  A reputational cascade occurs when 
individuals espouse views because doing so carries with it some sort of social 
advantage.90  In the case of a reputational cascade, the prevailing wisdom is 
accepted and perpetuated independent of, and sometimes in spite of, a society 
member’s actual worldview.91  An informational cascade, in contrast, is based 
upon the genuine acceptance that beliefs that are espoused by a significant 
segment of society must be correct. 92  The informational cascade is therefore 
driven by individuals’ search for data about their world.93
 In their search for truth and their efforts to maintain a positive reputation, 
individuals perpetuate beliefs that come to them through various communication 
channels by adopting those beliefs and communicating them to other members of 
86 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685. 
87. See Sunstein, Precautions, supra note 68, at 77.  
88 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685; See also, Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. 
Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability 
Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 102, 111 (2009) (discussing the “trigger phase” in their 
model of the availability campaign).  
89 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 686. The concept of informational and reputational 
motivations is related to the similar concepts of injunctive norms (norms of which most others 
approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (that which most others do). (Kuran and Sunstein 
point out that there may be overlap between these two types of cascades, and that this overlap 
occurs when individuals affected by these cascades have dual underlying motivations: obtaining 
information and gaining social approval).  See also generally, Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. 
Reno & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of 
Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1015, 1023 (1990). 
90 See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 
J. Legal Stud. 623, 623 (1998) (“. . .a reputational cascade [is]a self-reinforcing process by which 
people motivated to protect and enhance their reputations . . .”). 
91 Id. 
92 See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, 
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992 (1992) (discussing the 
utilitarian nature of informational cascades); see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 686; see 
also, Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151 (1998).  
93 For a discussion of how informational cascades can exacerbate risk aversion in a medical 
setting, see James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1641, 
1670 (2008)(“ . . . medicine is subject to informational cascades: the more physicians that adopt a 
new procedure, the greater the chance that other physicians will discount any individual 
misgivings and follow the herd.” ); see also generally, Bikhchandani et al., supra note 75 (for a 
more general discussion of herd behavior). 
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society.94  Availability cascades are reinforced and expanded in this fashion.  This 
process might not be problematic, according to Kuran and Sunstein, if it were not 
for the fact that the information about risk that travels like “wildfire”95 through 
social discourse is often incorrect or misleading.  Socially communicated risk 
information contains inflated estimates of risk and causes “public panics.”  Kuran 
and Sunstein are careful to qualify their claim; they stop short of characterizing as 
maladaptive human tendencies to seek information through social channels.  They 
acknowledge that social networks are valuable sources for information about 
potential harms.96  According to Kuran and Sunstein, the inefficiency occurs not 
because people look to others for information to form the basis for beliefs, but 
because communication cascades can help to create and can reinforce availability 
effects, which in turn, can lead to widespread misperceptions.97
 Although the primary article was coauthored by Kuran and Sunstein, 
Sunstein has written a series of article and essays–several of which serve as the 
foundation for Sunstein’s book Laws of Fear— that elaborate on the initial 
availability campaign paper.  Sunstein’s goal in this body of work is primarily 
normative.  He argues that an effective government should be deliberative, rather 
than simply reactive.  He makes the case that public panics can influence policy, 
resulting in inefficient and potentially harmful legislation. 98 Sunstein also takes 
issue with the precautionary principle, namely the notion that when a potential 
94 Sunstein, Precautions, supra note 68, at 96; See also, Recent Case, Immigration Law –
Administrative Adjudication – Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in 
Immigration Courts –Wang v. Attorney, 423 F. 3D 260 (3D CIR. 2005), and Benslimane v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3D 828, 119 HARV. L. REV.  2596, 2601 (2006) (explaining that politicians and 
the media repeat salient examples in a self-reinforcing availability cascade).  
95 This notion that information about fear travels like wildfire through society is the subject of a 
chapter in Sunstein’s book, LAWS OF FEAR entitled “Fear as Wildfire.”  Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS 
OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).[hereinafter Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR]  
96 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685 (“There is nothing irrational about participating in 
an informational cascade. Often people have little information about the magnitude of a risk or the 
seriousness of an alleged social problem. They stand to gain from tuning into, and letting 
themselves be guided by, the signals of others.”) 
97 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11-14 (in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic 
& Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (describing how the availability heuristic can lead to errors in 
reasoning and decision-making); see also Kuran & Sunstein supra note 64, at 688 (acknowledging 
that availability campaigns can spark useful debate on neglected issues, but maintaining that 
“availability campaigns sometimes do great harm by producing widespread availability errors”); 
see also, Kuran & Sunstein supra note 64, at 685 (“Under certain circumstances…[availability 
cascades] generate persistent social availability errors – widespread mistaken beliefs grounded in 
interactions between the availability heuristic and the social mechanisms we describe. The 
resulting mass delusions may last indefinitely, and they may produce wasteful or even detrimental 
laws and policies.”) (internal citations omitted).  
98 Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1067 (2000) 
(hereinafter Sunstein, Cognition)(noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic 
can produce a public demand for regulation even though the relevant risks are trivial, while 
producing little or no demand for regulation of risks that are large in magnitude); see Sunstein, 
Precautions, supra note 68, at 98 (noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic 
can produce a public demand for regulation regardless of the actual risk).  
CULTURE & RISK  19
risk is identified, steps should be taken to guard against the risk, even where 
scientific consensus is lacking. A primary claim of Sunstein’s body of work on 
risk response is that the tendency to take precautions against publicly perceived 
threats often imposes more costs than taking no action at all.  
E. The Cultural Evaluator Model and the Role of Emotion 
The rationale for omitting the public from risk policy decisions—as seen 
in the work of Kuran and Sunstein as well as in traditional risk management—is 
the notion that members of the public are irrationally influenced by their 
emotional reactions.99  The cultural view of risk perception questions this 
assumption.  Recent scholars interested in cultural antecedents of risk response 
question the notion that “facts” ascertained by experts should serve as the 
exclusive basis for sound risk policy. 100 Instead, they argue that “facts cannot be 
separated from values in policy-related science contexts.”101  Put differently, risk 
judgments are socially constructed, and do not exist as independent “truths” to be 
discovered.102  For the proponent of a cultural model, affective (emotional) 
responses to risk are expressions of socially and culturally derived values.103  As 
such, these affective responses gain legitimacy in the risk policy discussion.  
Legal scholar Dan Kahan writes, “When people draw on their emotions to judge 
the risk that such an activity poses, they form an expressively rational attitude 
99 Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2, at 59.“[Public risk judgments] are seen as irrational by many 
harsh critics of public perceptions. These critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the experts and 
the public. Experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, 
wise, and rational--based on the real risks. In contrast, the public is seen to rely on perceptions of 
risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational; see also, Kuran & 
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 683 (Supporting the notion that emotions can cause irrational decision-
making is the dual system concept of reasoning.  System 1 reasoning is “fast, automatic, effortless, 
associative, and often emotionally charged.” (Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1451 (2003)) On the other hand, 
System 2 reasoning is slow and deliberate, and more likely to include consideration of 
probabilities and careful weighing of costs and benefits.  Implications of this view is that System 1 
is necessary in situations where there is a lack of information and resources, but that it is more 
likely to result in error than System 2. Kahan’s claim, see Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of 
Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (2008); Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra
note 4, at 181.See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 128; Beck, supra note 9, at 
24. 
100 And yet, “[a]ssessment procedures derived from the public health, toxicity, and engineering 
studies that have dominated the management programs of governments and corporations 
illuminate one portion of the risk complex while concealing others.” Kasperson & Kasperson, 
supra note 18, at 96; See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 (arguing for the importance of the 
public’s role in risk assessment). 
101 Judith A. Bradbury, The Policy Implications of Differing Concepts of Risk 14 Sci., Tech. & 
Hum. Values, 380, 399 (1989). 
102 See id, at 381-82.(arguing that “factual” empirical evidence alone does not lead to any useful 
conclusions). 
103 See generally, Kahan, supra note 99. 
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about what it would mean for their cultural worldviews for society to credit the 
claim that that activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation.”104
Cultural theory is sometimes discussed with reference to cultural “biases,” 
or patterns of social relationships and cultural understandings that result in 
particular worldviews.105  A central feature of the theory is the notion that 
culturally derived values have legitimate influences over risk preferences.106  The 
membership of an individual in a certain class—hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, and fatalistic—is believed to help gauge that individual’s risk 
tolerance and preferences.107  Importantly, because all human beings are cultural 
evaluators, no one individual can act as an unbiased “expert” free from cultural 
influences on risk evaluations.  Hence, to allow certain individuals to serve as 
“experts” with unique power to formulate risk responses is to privilege the 
cultural understandings of a few members of society at the expense of the cultural 
understandings of the rest of society.108  Anthropologist Mary Douglas has argued 
that purportedly value-neutral scientists and policy analysts commonly foist their 
own values on the public.  Douglas claimed that “[the risk researcher’s] method 
assumes that all humans have the same responses and preferences that are 
enshrined in the utilitarian philosophy.  Instead of objectivity, we find ideological 
entrenchment.” 109   The often wholesale substitution of experts’ opinions for 
those of the public is particularly problematic when one considers data from 
studies suggesting that the public and experts hold divergent views about risks.110
Another critical aspect of the cultural evaluator model is the belief that individuals 
may have deeply personal reasons for choosing certain risks over others.111
Accordingly, a uniform approach to any particular source of risk should therefore 
be undertaken with the understanding that it may subvert the values of some 
members of society.   
104 Id.
105 The term “bias” is a bit of a misnomer, given that bias tends to have consistently negative 
connotations.  “Cultural tendencies” is probably more reflective of the nature of these underlying 
predilections.  
106 Marris, Langford, O’Riordan, supra note 4, at 636.  
107 Thompson and colleagues have discussed the variables as follows: “Group refers to the extent 
to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units.  The greater the incorporation, the more 
individual choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to which an 
individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions.  See Richard Ellis, Michael 
Thompson & Aron Wildavsky, CULTURAL THEORY 5 (1990). 
108 See Ellis, Thompson, Wildavsky, id. at 5; see generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28; see 
also, Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95, at 126, for examples of works that propose 
substituting public risk decisions with those of unbiased experts. 
109 As Douglas writes, “When he brackets off culture from his work, the well-intentioned risk 
analyst has tied his own hands.  He wants to be free of bias, he would rather pretend that bias is 
not important than sully himself by trying to categorize some kinds of bias. . . .” Mary Douglas, 
RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 13 (1992). See also, Mary Douglas & Aaron 
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers 
(1982). 
110 See James Flynn & Paul Slovic, Expert and Public Evaluations of Technological Risks: Search 
for Common Ground 10 Risk: Health Safety & Env't 333 (1999). 
111 Kahan, supra note 82, at 741. 
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 The availability cascade and cultural evaluator theories offer opposing 
normative claims in the area of risk policy and response.   Accordingly, Sunstein 
and Kahan have particular prescriptive agendas for risk managers and law makers.  
Rather than debating the merits of each claim in order to declare a victor, the 
current discussion extracts the elements underlying the predictive arguments.  
After distilling the data that serves as the basis for the normative arguments, the 
relevant information is incorporated into the model.   
F. Why A Comprehensive Model Is Necessary 
1. Limitations of Existing Theories 
 While each of the above methods of risk analysis lends something 
important to the discussion, none of the theories I have discussed provides a 
comprehensive framework to guide risk policy decisions.  Moreover, the theories 
are distinct; they do not build on one another, nor do they consistently learn from 
one another.112  Hence, each is necessarily incomplete.  In addition, each of the 
theories and methods has specific drawbacks.  This Article synthesizes the various 
theoretical perspectives to arrive at a complete model of public risk perception.113
The model represents a vital step toward a new understanding of how individuals 
assess and respond to potential threats.  It is designed to provide insight to risk 
managers and policy-makers in the course of decision-making.  The model should 
also serve as a basis for further conversation and healthy debate about the role of 
the citizenry and experts in risk management. 
 Psychometric studies of risk perception are useful to the extent that they 
get a detailed picture of those risks reported by people to be most worrisome.  
However, this method suffers from the fact that it asks questions about risk in a 
socially static context.114  Surveys about risk capture a snapshot of the risk 
judgments of a number of people, without providing a good understanding of the 
degree to which those judgments are individual or a source of social 
understandings.  At any given time, the risk perception of an individual might be 
influenced by information and evaluations of one or more other individuals.  
None of the social dynamic is explicitly captured or explained by psychometric 
studies of risk perception.115  Moreover, asking respondents in a laboratory setting 
about their attitudes regarding various types of hazards sacrifices external 
validity; in other words, responses elicited in this fashion may not be genuine.116
An experimental setting is not necessarily representative of what occurs out there 
112 The exception is SAR, which takes into account psychometric risk analysis. 
113 See Appendix. 
114 See Sjöberg, Policy Implications, supra note 5, at 15. 
115 There are other criticisms of this method as well.  One is that the data derived is based upon 
self reporting, which is a problematic method of gathering data because people are not always 
accurate or forthright about their own attitudes or behaviors.   
116 See generally, Bradbury, supra note 84, at 383-84 (suggesting that psychometric studies 
provide a subjectivist interpretation within an artifical paradigm that may provide unreliable 
results). 
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by the water cooler, on the neighborhood sidewalk, or at dinner parties.  Here 
there is a complex meeting of social, cultural, communication, and human 
elements. 
Social Amplification of Risk attempts to correct the primary failing of 
psychometric studies by incorporating an understanding of the social dynamic 
involved in risk response.  However, while SAR is an impressive attempt to 
derive a comprehensive model, the model accounts only for some of the 
empirically supported antecedents of risk perception.117  Moreover, although it is 
true that, as the SAR authors claim, “risk analysis . . . requires an approach that is 
capable of illuminating risk in its full complexity, is sensitive to the social settings 
in which risk occurs, and also recognizes that social interactions may either 
amplify or attenuate the signals to society about the risk,”118 the model is 
exceedingly complex.  The SAR model is arguably too elaborate to be useable 
and testable. 
Kuran and Sunstein’s work on the availability cascade is based upon the 
availability heuristic, a feature of human cognition that is well documented from 
an empirical standpoint. Although the theory is compelling, its foundation is a 
normative claim, and its “proof” is historical anecdote.  Because it is backward-
looking, it lacks predictive power.  Moreover, Kuran and Sunstein’s normative 
claim is subject to criticism on several fronts. 119First, it assumes that risks 
possessing certain features are worthy of attention and resource expenditure, 
while others are not.120  Second, it also recommends handing over the decision 
making to “experts,” an approach that is increasingly questioned.121  As Beck has 
noted, “There is no expert on risk . . . [w]here and how does one draw the line 
between still acceptable and no longer acceptable exposures?”122  Third, 
unchecked deference to risk experts also undervalues the potential benefits 
stemming from social pressure for change.123  Fourth, it assumes a unidirectional 
effect of social cascades. As Arie Rip points out “the focus as well as the concern 
is about intensification and the additional social costs accompanying 
‘exaggerated’ responses . . . while there is no (equivalent discussion or examples) 
117 Pidgeon, supra note 59, at 147.  
118 Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18 at 96. See also, Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71. 
119 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685 (“Under certain cirucumstances…[availability 
cascades] generate persistent social availability errors – widespread mistaken beliefs grounded in 
interactions between the availability heuristic and the social mechanisms we describe. The 
resulting mass delusions may last indefinitely, and they may produce wasteful or even detriminetal 
laws and policies”)(internal citations omitted)  
120 It claims to possess a wisdom that trumps the prevailing wisdom of the time. See Molly J. 
Walker Wilson, Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally Emotional Public, 54 St. Louis 
L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2010). See also generally, Douglas, note . 
121 See Sjöberg,  Policy Implications, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that experts give considerably 
lower risk estimates than the public whenever they rate risks that fall within their own field of 
expertise and responsibility).  
122 Beck, supra note 9 at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
123 See also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71. 
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of the social costs of attenuation of risk.”124  And finally, the theory is of limited 
practical use in predicting public responses to potential sources of danger, because 
it lacks a comprehensive theory to predict specific factors and environments that 
contribute to public risk perception.125
2. What We Stand to Gain from a Comprehensive Model 
In addition to the limitations explained above, because each of the 
theoretical perspectives addresses a different focus, none of them provides a 
complete picture of how members of the public view different types of risks in the 
diverse social and cultural circumstances that can influence and shape 
perceptions.  A model that draws on the best of each body of work gains a 
richness that any one approach standing alone lacks.  This model also— because 
it is self-consciously focused on public perception—supplies law makers and 
experts what they have been lacking, the ability to include the individual lay 
perspective in the decision-making equation.126
Inclusion of the public in the decision-making process will result in a more 
discursive, thoughtful process of decision-making in the face of some of the most 
serious threats.127  Because understanding of public risk perception is so limited, 
law and policy makers currently lack the ability to incorporate public attitudes 
prior to taking a course of action.  Instead, they must wait for the public’s reaction 
after the fact, and then the feedback is often limited to situations in which the 
outcome is sufficiently disastrous to generate public outrage.  The advantages of 
having a model that could help determine risk preferences of members of the 
public in advance cannot be overstated. 128
III. FOCI OF EXISTING RISK PARADIGMS
124 Rip questions the assumption that social amplification is necessarily problematic, as his title 
illustrates: Should Social Amplification of Risk Be Counteracted? 8, 2 Risk Analysis 193 (1988). 
125 In advancing his claims, Sunstein draws on the theories of Fischhoff, Slovic, Beck, Kasperson, 
all of which are also discussed in this Article. 
126 See Appendix. 
127 See Dana, supra note 201 at 1328 (arguing that decision-makers are more likely to consider 
carefully the consequences of various risks when the public is involved in the conversation). 
128 Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural 
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2006)(“the public welfare of 
democratic societies depends on their capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made 
hazards…”); see Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Why Study Risk Perception?, 2 
RISK ANALYSIS 83, 83 (1982) ( the question “how safe is safe enough?” appears to be [a] major 
policy issue); see also, Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., 
supra note 31, at 127-52.(Citizens of modern industrial societies are presently learning a harsh and 
discomforting lesson-that the benefits from technology must be paid for not only with money, but 
with lives…With increasing frequency, policy makers…have been turning to risk-benefit 
analysis…as the basic decision-making methodology for societal risk-taking.”).
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 Scholars who have studied risk perception have generally focused on one 
of several methodologies. One line of research has applied broad findings from 
behavioral decision-making to risk perceptions.129  Another approach involves 
identifying which characteristics of hazards particularly likely to trigger fear or 
concern in an attempt to derive a “cognitive map” of risk perception from that 
data.130  Another focus of research emphasizes the social component of risk 
perception, examining the dynamic nature of risk communication as information 
travels through public discourse.131  Yet another line of work focuses on the 
impact of cultural or sub-cultural factors on beliefs about risks.132  Each 
theoretical approach has provided a different emphasis; each has yielded valuable 
insights, and yet none is sufficient on its own.  The various areas or issues 
emphasized by the different perspectives are discussed in general terms below.  
This discussion sets the stage for subsequent consideration of the factors most 
likely to cause  individuals concern. .  
A.  Features of Human Decision-Making and Cognition 
Any discussion of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty would 
be incomplete without the consideration of elements of human cognition first 
described by Herbert Simon, a psychologist, sociologist, and political scientist, 
who was interested in the question of how human beings make decisions.  In 
1955, Simon published a paper introducing the notion of “bounded rationality.”133
The notion that people are boundedly rational (or “satisficers”), refers to human 
beings’ limited capacity to collect, store, and retrieve information, as well as the 
tendency of individuals to fail to apply standard rules of logic when making 
decisions.  Simon, and other proponents of bounded rationality questioned rational 
choice theory (RCT), the neoclassical economic theory predicting that human 
beings effectively maximize their own expected utility through decision-making 
contexts.134  RCT has not held up under close empirical scrutiny.135  Social science 
129 See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 128.  
130 See Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2, at 222.  
131 See Kasperson, Renn, & Slovic et al., supra note 3, at 177.  
132 These four topic areas represent the major themes in risk perception.  Other themes surface in 
the context of risk management, such as the appropriate role of democratic participation and 
governance, philosophical considerations about the value of a small number of lives versus 
conveniences benefiting society in general, and so on.  
133. Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” in the 1950s to account for the 
fact that human beings have finite computational resources available for making choices.  See 
generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99 (1955) and 
Herbert Simon, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, VOL. 2 (1982). Simon was a prolific scholar.  
Other of his important works in the area of bounded rationality include: Herbert A. Simon, Models 
of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social 
Setting 198-99 (1957); Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293 (1985). 
134 See generally, Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 1996).  
135 See generally, Herbet A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 
(1955) (for an early discussion of behavioral decision making); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
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research has revealed an extensive network of interrelated heuristics and biases 
that serve as the basis for much of human decision making.136  In the simplest 
terms, empirical investigations have borne out Simon’s hypothesis, demonstrating 
that human beings have limited memories, an inability to gather all relevant 
information and correctly weight factors, and the tendency to be influenced by 
biased or irrelevant information.137
Behavioral decision theorists, who focus on identifying cognitive patterns 
and social factors that influence decision-making, have been profoundly 
influenced by the work of Simon.138  Eschewing rational choice theory in favor of 
Simon’s bounded rationality, modern behavioral decision theorists have attempted 
to explain how human beings make decisions in light of empirically demonstrated 
realities of choice formation.  Nowhere is this body of work more relevant than in 
the context of the type of decision-making involved in evaluating risks.139  Like 
other decision tasks, seeking information, analyzing the information, and 
determining the appropriate involves searching, storage, and retrieval of 
information, perception and reasoning.140 Hence research and theory on decision-
making generally has clear relevance for risk perception and response.  In fact, 
risk responses may be particularly vulnerable to non-rational judgment formation 
because this type of decision-making often involves a high degree of uncertainty.  
ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing empirical investigations of how human beings process 
information and make choices). 
136 These heuristics and biases have been discussed under the rubric of “behavioral decision 
theory” or “behavioral law and economics” and include anchoring and adjustment, optimism bias, 
representativeness heuristic, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, endowment effect and related 
status quo bias, risk aversion, and the availability heuristic, to name a few. 
137 Decision-making using incomplete or imperfect information is an important feature of human 
functioning in the real world.  Scholarship supporting this notion is abundant.  Sometimes called 
behavioral decision theory, sometimes behavioral law and economics, the interdisciplinary field 
that explores cognitive features of human decision-making combines law, psychology, and 
economic principles—as they relate to the “rational actor”.  See e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 
supra note 65 at 1471 (“The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore the 
implications of actual not hypothesized human behavior for the law. How do “real people” differ 
from homo economicus?”) (internal parentheses omitted). 
138 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341, 347-48 (1984) [hereinafter Choices]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263-91 (1979)[hereinafter Prospect 
Theory]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1972).  For some early law review pieces 
discussing heuristical processing and responses in legal frameworks, see Kelman et al., supra note 
, at 1436-42.(discussing the availability and representative heuristics); see also, Underwood, supra 
note . (“[S]tudies show that in making individualized judgments people rely primarily on 
information about the case at hand, paying relatively little attention to background information 
about other cases.”). 
139 Id.  
140 See Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, What We Have Learned so Far, in SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 5 (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & ABC 
Research Group, eds., Oxford University Press 1999) (showing how building blocks control 
information search, stop search, and make decisions that can be put together to form classes of 
heuristics). 
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Moreover, information about risks is particularly well-suited to exploitation by 
motivated actors.141  The literature on heuristics and biases in decision-making 
can provide a good foundation for understanding particular patterns of decision-
making in the area of risk.  Limits on the rationality of human decision-making 
have been discussed at length elsewhere, and have been considered specifically in 
the risk perception context, often to demonstrate a systematic lack of rationality in 
how individual members of the public respond to potential dangers.142
B.  Characteristics of the Communication Context 
Over the past century, the number of sources of information about risk has 
grown tremendously.  Whereas risk information used to be conveyed by public 
officials, carried in newspaper stories, and, most commonly, traded during face-
to-face communication between members of society, today, the risk 
communication picture is increasingly multifaceted  and complex. 143 Some 
commentators opine that the growth in the number of communication forms have 
contributed to the advent of the “risk culture” of today.  According to David 
Altheide,  
[F]ear is more visible and routine in public discourse than it was a 
decade ago .... This communication environment is part of our everyday 
world; it is popular culture and we are it, and we like it; we play with it; 
we play with the reporters and the institutional news sources who exploit 
the fear script for their own benefits.144
 Differences in how members of the public receive information about risks 
mean that there are more possible sources of “input.”  It also means that there is 
more potential for these sources to interact and amplify or attenuate perceptions 
141 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of 
Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1456 (1999)(listing the ways in which features of 
human decision-making—particularly with respect to product-related risks—can be exploited for 
financial gain ). 
142 See generally, Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2; see also generally, Cohl, supra note; Barry 
Glassner, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS (2000). 
143 See William Leiss, Three Phases in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practice, 545 Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 85-94 (1996) (tracking the evolution of 
risk communication during the last twenty years.) See generally, Baruch Fischhoff, Risk 
Perception and Communication Unplugged: TwentyYears of Process 15, 2 Risk Analysis 137-45 
(1995) (identifying a series of 7 different developmental stages in risk communication): 
 (1)All we have to do is get the numbers right 
 (2)All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
 (3) All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
 (4) All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past 
 (5) All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them 
 (6) All we have to do is treat them nice 
 (7) All we have to do is make them partners. 
Id.  
144 Altheide, supra note 13, at 664 
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about risks.  For example, if Susan hears her neighbor express concern about 
negative health effects from hormones in beef, she can seek out more information 
on the Internet.  On the Internet, she will no doubt discover a range of information 
sources, from on-line news stories, to individuals expressing views via blogs or in 
chat rooms, to official reports issued by the National Institutes of Health.145
Depending upon which sites she reads, she will be comforted or increasingly 
concerned.146  The story is more complicated still by the fact that various patterns 
of communication led to the views expressed on the websites available to Susan.  
Thus, the picture of communication about risk is an increasingly complex one 
consisting of expert opinion, media selection and promulgation, and social 
discourse. 
Risk communication research is a body of work that has grown out of the 
collective attempt of investigators, agency heads and political leaders to carry on 
a productive dialogue with the public about various risks.147  Many of the writings 
available on risk communication have been composed with the purpose of 
providing investigators, political leaders, and agency administrators with strategic 
guidance regarding effective risk communication. Another broad area of research 
has studied the impact of the media on how members of society view risks.148
Finally, research on the influence of heuristics and biases has revealed the 
importance of features of the communication context for resulting risk 
perception.149  Findings from each of these bodies of scholarship can inform a 
comprehensive theory of how risk communication and idea exchange ultimately 
influences risk perception. 
C.  The Role of Facilitators 
145 For examples of a variety of sources of information, see 
http://www.seattlepi.com/national/case22.shtml; 
report.nih.gov/award/trends/InstInfoExcel.cfm?OrgID=6218701&amp;Year=2008 (for an NIH 
report); http://www.organicconsumers.org/Toxic/hormoncancer.cfm (for a source promoting 
organic products); http://www.thebeefsite.com/articles/1734/the-big-question-over-beef-hormones 
(last visited, Mar. 23, 2010).
146 For more examples, see http://www.sustainabletable.org/issues/hormones/; Janice Castro, 
Cristina Garcia, & Adam Zagorini, Why The Beef Over Hormones?, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,956754,00.html;  Samuel S. Epstein, 
Hormones in U.S. Beef Linked to Increased Cancer Risk, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 6, 
2009, http://world-wire.com/news/0910210001.html; 
http://www.beefmyths.org/beefmyths/cattlegrowthhormones/(last visited June 10, 2010).  
147 See e.g., Lee Thomas’ remark, “One of the greatest challenges facing those concerned with 
health and environmental risks is how to carry on a useful public dialogue on these subjects.  In a 
democracy, it is the public that ultimately makes the key decisions on how these risks will be 
controlled.  The stakes are too high for us not to do our very best.” Effective Risk Communication: 
The Role of Responsibility of Government and Nongovernment Organizations, (in Covello, V. T., 
McCallum, D. B., & Pavlova, M. T. eds., 1989). 
148Altheide, supra note 13, at 664; see also, Anders Wahlberg & Lennart Sjöberg, Risk Perception 
in the Media, 3 Journal  of Risk Research 31, 31-50 (2000). 
149 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178; see also, Paul Slovic, Perception II supra 
note 8 at 280; see also, C.A. Vlek & P. J. M. Stallen, Judging Risks and Benefits in the Small and 
the Large, 28 Org. Behav. & Human Performance (1981). 
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H. L. Mencken once said that “the whole aim of practical politics is to keep 
the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety), by menacing it 
with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.”150  Closely related to 
both the bounded rationality literature and to the work on risk communication is 
consideration of strategic attempts to influence mass behavior.  Timur Kuran and 
Cass Sunstein dub players who engage in public opinion crafting, “availability 
entrepreneurs.”151  The term “availability entrepreneur” connotes a particular 
ideological slant or “pet cause.”  In this Article, the term facilitator is used in 
place of “entrepreneur,” because the media, which plays a significant role in 
shaping public beliefs, tends to be driven by different considerations than 
traditional entrepreneurs such as watchdog groups, grassroots organizations, and 
industry leaders. The term “facilitator” includes the availability entrepreneur (as 
conceived of by Kuran and Sunstein) as well as anyone who stands to benefit 
from promulgating information for purposes garnering public attention.  The 
media is a prime example.152
 During a political campaign season or any time an individual or group is 
particularly interested in advancing an agenda on the national stage, there is an 
increased likelihood of risks to be publicized.153  Facilitators commonly frame 
issues in a manner that makes the danger appear to be particularly imminent and 
destructive.154  Often there will be a battle between facilitators with opposing 
agendas, and the dangers inherent in one risk will be played up in defense of other 
potential hazards.155  Facilitators’ motivations are influenced by temporal factors 
and cultural factors among others.  The success of such facilitators in exciting the 
populace depends upon conditions such as the state of current technology, the 
degree to which the population has been primed to fear certain activities and other 
factors that make members of society receptive to risk communications. 
D.  Characteristics of the Risk 
It is possible to think about the risks we face on two different levels: the 
micro (individual hazard) level and the macro (general fear of hazards) level. 156
On the one hand, one might consider risk perception as it pertains to risks that 
individual citizens routinely encounter.  Members of the public view some classes 
of hazards as particularly threatening and other classes of hazards as relatively 
150 H. L. Mencken, IN DEFENSE OF WOMEN 29 (1922). 
151 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 703. 
152 The media is discussed at length in Section IV. 
153 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185.  It is tempting to draw the conclusion that 
public concern over a risk that is publicized as part of a political strategy is, by definition, 
overblown.  However, that is not necessarily the case.  See also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71. 
154 See Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 9. 
155 Beck, supra note 9, at 31. 
156 Wahlberg & Sjöberg, supra note 127, at 37. 
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innocuous.157  Psychometric risk researchers seek to explain differences in 
attitudes about various type of potential hazards as well as identifying which 
potential risks cause the most concern, and why.158  As previously noted, today’s 
risks are widely characterized as particularly challenging for several reasons.  
New technologies pose particular hazards because their dangers may not be 
discovered for some period of time.159  Pressures to implement new technologies, 
and the potential for financial gain mean that manufactures and developers may 
downplay the potential for harm or may curtail research efforts. 160 Threats to 
health and well-being from new products and processes may be difficult to asses, 
even with substantial research findings.161   In particular, hazards associated with 
novel inventions can sometimes have negative impacts into the future, threatening 
the health of the nation’s children and grandchildren.162
When it comes to individual risk assessment, there are substantial 
discrepancies in the perceived seriousness of various potential harms.  As 
discussed previously, the most common method of studying risk perception is to 
ask individuals to assess various potential hazards in order to determine which are 
perceived to pose the greatest risk.163  The psychometric study of risk has also 
included attempts to determine which characteristics of a hazard or hazard 
situation are likely to trigger concern.164 A number of empirical investigations of 
risk preference have revealed some reliable patterns of “public” (as opposed to 
expert) risk perception.  For example, risks assumed involuntarily, and those that 
are associated with unfamiliar sources and have potentially catastrophic 
consequences (such as risks posed by nuclear energy) are particularly feared,165
whereas risks associated with familiar activities where the potential for harm is 
157 Some examples are nuclear waste (high) automobile use (low) terrorism (high) global warming 
(changing). 
158 Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 128.  
159 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280. 
160 See Dorothy Nelkin, Communicating Technological Risk: The Social Construction of Risk 
Perception, 10 Annual Review of Public Health 95, 96 (1989)(reviews the issues involved in 
communicating risk to the public) 
161 See also, Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer 
contaminate the risk experience, which, instead, now involved negotiating a 
new and perplexing array of global threats associated with modern 
armaments, chemicals and radiation often invisible to the senses, 
contaminants whose effects surface only after decades or generations, 
hazards created by peoples and technologies in distant part of the globe, and 
harms arising from the flow and control of information. 
162 Beck, supra note , at 19 (1992) (“Atomic accidents are accidents no more in the limited sense 
of the word ‘accident.’  They outlast generations.”) Id. (internal parenthetical omitted.) 
163 Id. 
164 For the arguable earliest research using this method, see Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus 
Technological Risk, 165 Science 1232 (1969) (positing that society has, by trial and error, 
determined an acceptable level of safety for many common activities, and calling this theory the 
“revealed preference” approach).  
165 See generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 ; Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2; 
Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18; Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31. 
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“localized” and where the risk is voluntarily assumed, are generally characterized 
as less threatening.166  By examining beliefs about latent dangers, some critical 
patterns emerge that may have predictive potential in the broader public risk 
perception context. 
E.  Characteristics of the Targets and Victims 
1.  The relationship between Target and Victim 
One of the primary differences between traditional risk analysis, on the 
one hand, and psychometric, cultural, or decision-theory based approaches to risk 
management, on the other, is the source of the data.  Whereas traditional risk 
analysis is based upon scientific data and expert analysis, more recent approaches 
have solicited the views of non-experts, so-called “average citizens.”167
Intriguing, and potentially critical questions arise with respect to whether those 
evaluating risks are “stakeholders.”  If the person evaluating the risk is also a 
potential victim of that risk (a stakeholder), he or she may predictably respond 
differently to the risk than would a non-stakeholder.  An individual may also be 
thought of as a stakeholder if he or she has a strong interest in the well-being of a 
potential victim (as is true in the case of a parent-child relationship).   
Not surprisingly, whether an individual who is evaluating a risk is a 
stakeholder makes a difference in how the risk is perceived.  A stakeholder can be 
expected to experience more emotion with respect to a risk when that risk is self-
relevant.168  Emotions, in turn, play an important role not only in how much 
people care about addressing harms, but also in how they evaluate future 
outcomes.  Anger, for instance, is correlated with an optimistic view, while 
sadness is correlated with pessimism.169  To the extent that emotions are 
heightened in stakeholders, existing predilections will be exaggerated.170
Interestingly however, respondents avoid characterizing themselves as 
166 See generally, Slovic, Perception II supra note 8; Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 ; 
Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2; Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31. 
167 See Slovic, supra note , (“[Traditional] risk analysis is distinctly “expert-centered” and 
uncomfortable with (or even hostile to) considering the views of diverse, nonexpert parties. It is 
also uncomfortable with a broadly multidimensional view of risk. In contrast, and in the spirit of 
the arguments in this paper, decision analysis seeks out the diverse views of interested and 
affected stakeholders.”) 
168  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 70 (2007) 
(Suggesting that strong emotional reactions to self-relevant risks might lead legislatures to take 
action to prevent affected members of the public from making hasty, ill-advised decisions.) 
169 Jennifer S. Lerner, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, Baruch Fischhoff, Effects of Fear 
and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism, 14 Psychological Science 144, 148 (2003)(“ 
Experiencing more anger triggered more optimistic beliefs; experiencing more fear triggered 
greater pessimism.”) 
170Kahan, supra note 82 ( “. . . perceptions of danger naturally feed upon one another among 
persons who share cultural commitments. This form of group polarization in risk perceptions, 
then, is another dynamic that can be explained consistently with the view that emotion is a form of 
expressive perception and not a cognitive bias.”)(internal citations omitted).  
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stakeholders when possible.  When there is uncertainty as to the scope and 
direction of a risk, respondents are significantly more likely to see others as at risk 
than they are to see themselves as potential victims.171
The risk perception picture is more complicated than the stakeholder/non-
stakeholder dichotomy would suggest, because even citizens who are not directly 
affected by a particular threat may care deeply about how government or private 
industry responds to the harm.  Specifically, risks to subgroups within the U.S. are 
likely to have special significance for the American population more generally, 
because how our government protects its citizens is a matter of concern to the 
society as a whole.172 The oft-cited Love Canal disaster is a situation in which the 
public at large received (and sought out) information about dangers facing 
residents of Love Canal.  Ultimately, the question for Americans watching the 
Love Canal events unfold was, “How does the U.S. government respond when a 
toxic waste site is discovered under a settled community?”173  A more recent 
example is Hurricane Katrina; the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina 
was no doubt unsettling to Americans, not only because they felt outrage over 
injustices or empathy for the victims, but also because the American public 
witnessed the failure of its government to adequately respond to the needs of its 
citizens.174  Risk events provide citizens with opportunities to assess their 
government’s ability and willingness to protect members of society.  The signals 
sent by government agencies and actors following a disaster can have long lasting 
consequences for citizen risk perceptions, as will become evident in Section IV.175
2. Language as a Product of Culture. 
171 Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, supra note , at 149.  Lerner also found that the effects of 
emotion on risk perception generalizes from the perceived likelihood of self-relevant outcomes 
(“will it happen to me?”) to other-relevant outcomes.  This tendency is related to the optimism 
bias, the tendency to attribute superior traits to oneself and to predict positive outcomes for one’s 
own future.  See Lauri Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in 
Organizational Planning, 62 J. Applied Psychol. 194, 194 (1977)(reporting that management 
students overestimated the likelihood that they will outperform competitors); K. Patricia Cross, 
Not Can, But Will College Teaching Improve?, New Directions for Higher Educ., Spring 1977, at 
1, 4 (citing a study indicating that ninety-four percent of college professors think that their work is 
above average); see also, John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social Comparative 
Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism 
Effects, 130 Psychol. Bull. 813, 813 (2004).
172 See Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations: Systemic Reform of Public Schools 
as a Matter of Justice11 Mich. J. Race & L. 419, 423 (2006)(“individuals expect protection from 
the state . . . . For the government itself to cause harm adds an element of outrage generally not 
present in purely private wrongdoing.” (citing Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law 50 (Oxford University Press 1999)). 
173 LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL 1 (State of New York Press 1982) 
174 See Russel S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 127 Public Choice 55, 56 (2006) available at 
http://www.peterleeson.com/Hurricane_Katrina.pdf; see also Larry Cox, A Movement for Human 
Rights in the United States: Reasons for Hope 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 135, 145 ((citing the 
desire for change sparked by “the outrage over the abandonment of people of color during 
Hurricane Katrina. . .”) 
175 See Section III, infra
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The term “cultural factors” includes a complex set of considerations 
relating to the characteristics of a population that is influenced by shared patterns 
of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding 
learned through socialization within a particular group of people.176  Although 
individuals within a particular culture have a variety of individual experiences, 
worldviews and belief systems, they share common social values out of which 
arise common understandings of important aspects of society.177
 Language is a critical factor in how individuals understand risk. 178
Language is more than the medium through which probabilities about outcomes is 
conveyed; it is a product of culture and subcultures, and can therefore imbue new 
meaning in the process of serving as a conduit for information.  For this reason, 
terminology becomes critical.  Certain terms and phrases carry with them 
culturally defined meanings, and have moral or political dimensions that can be 
quite powerful.179  Semantics contribute to risk perception in powerful ways, 
particularly when language is emotive.180  Alternatively, language is used to 
minimize the seriousness of a situation or to rob an issue of its emotional content. 
181 For example, it has been argued that advocates of the death penalty have 
176 The term “culture” has comprised many, many different definitions.  See, e.g., A. L. Kroeber & 
Clyde Kluckhohn, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS. (1952) 
(detailing 164 separate definitions of culture). 
177 See e.g., G. Hofstede, National Cultures and Corporate Cultures. in COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN CULTURES 51 (L.A. Samovar & R.E. Porter, eds., 1984) ("Culture is the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another."); see also, J. A. Banks & C.A. McGee, MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION (1989) ("Most 
social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and 
intangible aspects of human societies. The essence of a culture is not its artifacts, tools, or other 
tangible cultural elements but how the members of the group interpret, use, and perceive them. It 
is the values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that distinguish one people from another 
in modernized societies; it is not material objects and other tangible aspects of human societies. 
People within a culture usually interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the 
same or in similar ways.");  see also, J.P. Lederach, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES (1995) ("Culture is the shared knowledge and schemes 
created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social 
realities around them.") 
178 See Nelkin, supra note , at 95. (discussing “the complex and controversial process of evaluating 
the hazards of technologies, communicating information about potential risks, and developing 
appropriate controls”).  
179 Moeller, Susan (2007-06-21). "Jumping on the US Bandwagon for a "War on Terror"". Yale 
Global Online. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=9324 (reporting on a study that found that the U.S. 
media had reported on Pakistan in terms that were biased and portrayed a monolithic population, 
rather than the more accurate complex and varied culture).  
180 Patricia Greenspan, Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body (2001)(draft on file with 
author)(“Affect itself essentially evaluates something as in some respect good or bad--good or bad 
for the organism (to be sought after or avoided), in the most primitive cases. With cognitive 
development this evaluative content takes on the possibilities of semantical richness that we 
associate with propositions.”) 
181 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 
107 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 534 (2007)[Hereinafter Sunstein, American Reactions] (“White House 
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developed “sterile” or “medical” terms for the procedure by which a death 
sentence is administered in order to mask the distasteful and frightening reality.182
Vivid language has also been used to evoke emotions in the recipient in an effort 
to provoke certain behaviors.  For example, public health campaigns have used 
evocative language (and images) to convey messages about the consequences of 
cigarette smoking, to tout the benefits of breast feeding, and to encourage safe-sex 
practices.183  Previously entrenched cultural standards and values are often used 
strategically to sell the message.  For example, a breast-feeding campaign may 
draw on images of motherhood that trigger the culturally defined role of woman 
as self-sacrificing provider and protector.184  The effect of these campaigns—
when they are successful—is often to create new associations that become fixed 
in cultural understandings.
 These cultural understandings vary from subgroup to subgroup within a 
population; subgroups often have their own set of values and priorities.  
Subgroups can consist of members of a particular trade or profession, immigrant 
populations, ethnic or racial groups, religious groups, or inhabitants of a particular 
neighborhood or locale.185  The features that define the group serve as the basis 
for communication, for example, when dairy farmers exchange information, it is 
most often about aspects of the trade, when parents of children attending a 
particular school see one another at a PTO meeting, they tend to talk about their 
children and education issues.  
 One robust finding from empirical investigations of attitude formation is 
the tendency of like-minded individuals to reinforce one another’s beliefs.186
Group polarization occurs in the context of risk perception as well.  Accordingly, 
officials under President Bush asked executive officials to use the term “climate change” in 
preference of “global warming,” evidently with the belief that “climate change” is abstract and 
relatively neutral). 
182 An example is a typical description of the procedure used to administer the death sentence.  
183 One example of a campaign that used rhetoric and imagery in this way arose out of an effort to 
get women to breastfeed their infants.  Joan B. Wolf, Is Breast Really Best? Risk and Total 
Motherhood in the National Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign, 32 Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law 595 (2007)(“From June 2004 to April 2006, cosponsored by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services and the Ad Council, the National Breastfeeding Awareness 
Campaign (NBAC) warned women that not breast-feeding put babies at risk for a variety of health 
problems. "You'd never take risks before your baby is born. Why start after?" asked televised 
public service announcements over images of pregnant women logrolling and riding a mechanical 
bull.”) 
184See Rebecca Kukla, Ethics and Ideology in Breastfeeding Campaigns, 21HYPATIA 157-180 
(2006); See also, Orit Avishai, Managing The Lactating Body: The Breast-Feeding Project and 
Privileged Motherhood, 30 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 135-152 (2007).  
185 See Dora C. Lau, J. Keith Murnighan, Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The 
Compositional Dynamics of Organizational Groups, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 325, 326, 329 
(1998) (explaining that faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into 
subgroups based on attributes such as age, personal values, personality, race, job status). 
186 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010). (“When groups of 
like-minded individuals discuss issues, their views become more entrenched, and they are less 
likely to be open to new or different ideas.”).
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“a group of people who fear the effects of second-hand smoke, or who believe 
that pesticides carry significant risks, is likely, after discussion, to believe that the 
health dangers here are extremely serious. 187  So too, a group of people who tend 
to think that the risks of global warming have been exaggerated will tend to think, 
after discussion, that global warming is no cause for concern.”188  Group 
polarization is related to a related concept called affiliation bias, whereby experts 
tend to interpret scientific findings in a manner that benefits their employers.189
The inclination to gravitate toward the view of other members of a group is called 
affiliation bias190, and has been offered as evidence of irrationality in human 
decision-making, although the evolutionary advantage of this tendency is clear, 
given that humans are social animals that rely on one another to unravel complex 
problems and accomplish higher tasks.  The power and prevalence of the 
affiliation bias can hardly be overstated, and its effects on risk responses are 
worthy of serious consideration.   
F. Other Characteristics: Temporal and Contextual Factors 
1.  Contextual Factors 
Several factors exogenous to the risk and target can influence risk 
perceptions.  Strictly speaking, “context” defined broadly, can be conceived of as 
similar or the same as “culture”.  For example, one aspect of the risk “context” in 
western societies is our system of food production. 191  Our society has changed 
from one in which we were primarily focused on producing enough to sustain the 
population, to an industrialized society in which constantly developing 
technologies provide more food, clothing, and shelter to a greater percentage of 
187 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175, 176 (2002) 
(explaining how polarization occurs when members of a deliberating group move toward a more 
extreme point as a result of deliberation caused by the  members’ predisposed views); see also,
Cass R. Sunstein, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 89, 96) (2002) 
(stating that “if members of a group tend to be concerned about global warming, pesticides 
causing cancer, . . . and secondhand smoke . . . they will tend to have a heightened fear of these 
things.” ).  
188 See Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95.  
189 Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 311.  
190 Id. at 311-13. 
191 See Ting-Tooney Gudykunst , CULTURE AND INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION, 30 (1988) 
(The definition of “culture” is a debated issue, and has been given many different definitions in the 
literature, including “a script or schema shared by a large group of people.”); see also, SURVEY OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE(SOCIOLOGY)(Frank N. Magill ed., 1994) ([Culture is] “complex patterns of living 
developed by humans and passed down through the generations”); see also, A DICTIONARY OF 
SOCIOLOGY.45 (G. Duncan Mitchell ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979) (Culture is defined by 
“that part of the total repertoire of human action (and its products), which is socially as opposed to 
genetically transmitted.”); and see Allan G. Johnson, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF 
SOCIOLOGY 74 (2000)(“the accumulated store of symbols, ideas, and material products associated 
with a social system, whether it be an entire society or a family is one of the major key elements of 
every social system and a key concept in defining the sociological perspective.”)  
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the population, while simultaneously introducing heretofore unknown risks.192
Technologies exert pressures on culture; cultures are shaped by technologies.  
And technologies are, to a large extent, supported or stifled by cultural beliefs. 193
One particularly apt example is cloning.  Value-laden judgments about the 
wisdom of investing in, and even permitting, such a technology have influenced 
the state of the science in this area.194
Technology can also interact with geography with interesting results.  In 
the modern, post-industrial world, pollutants generated in the Midwestern United 
States travel in a predictable path to the northeastern states, and effluents from 
China threaten the well-being of people living in Australia.195  Some risks are 
geographically localized, and others defy geography and pose dangers to the 
entire global environment and all who inhabit it.196  Accordingly, geographic 
features and location of a population group can help to shape which risks become 
prominent to members of that society. 
2.  Temporal Factors 
Individuals become aware of potential hazards in a variety of ways.  
Sometimes the discovery of a new health threat is revealed following the 
publication of a scientific study.197  Following an environmental disaster, the 
192 See Beck, supra note 9, at 19 (1992) (linking the end of the “society of scarcity” with the 
advent of a new society in which novel productive forces resulted in new risks “unleashed to an 
extent previously unknown.”) Id.
193 See Roger Roots, The Dangers of Automobile Travel A Reconsideration, 66 AM. J. OF ECON.
AND SOC. 959, 959 (2007)(demonstrating that despite being the leading cause of death, the greatest 
killer of children and young adults, and historically criticized by experts as unsafe and inefficient, 
the automobile has persisted due to America’s “love affair” with personal transportation); See 
also, Lori Khan, Ethics Analysis of the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Debate (Washburn 
University) (2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119402http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119402 
(demonstrating that new technologies, like stem cell research, may be hotly debated and stifled 
due to opposition from powerful cultural entities, in this case religious institutions and political 
parties). 
194 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178 (“Risk is a bellwether in social 
decisions about technologies”) 
195 Pollution Travels the Globe, Study Confirms, LiveScience Sept. 29, 2009 (found at: 
http://www.livescience.com/environment/090929-foreign-pollution.html, last visited, July 26, 
2010); Satellite Measures Pollution From East Asia to North America NASA March, 2008 (found 
at http://geology.com/nasa/monitoring-pollution-by-satellite.shtml, last visited, July 26, 2010) ; 
Michael Reilly, Air Pollution Travels, Kills Thousands Annually Discovery News (found at 
http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2009/08/14/air-pollution-overseas.html (last visited July 26, 2010).
196 See Beck, supra note 9, at 27 (1992) (citing DDT found in arctic penguins as an example of the 
globalization of risk). 
197 For example, a report on the effects of long-term exposure to bisphenol A (BPA) triggered 
concern among many, particularly parents of children, over the use of baby bottles and childproof 
plastic cups.  See The National Toxicology Program U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services NTP-CERHR, Monograph on the Potential Human Reproductive and Developmental 
Effects of Bisphenol A Center For The Evaluation of Risks To Human Reproduction September 
2008 NIH Publication No. 08 – 5994.  For some examples of the types of events that can trigger 
communication about risk, see See also, Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
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government, the media, and public interest groups may all communicate 
information about the event.198  How the “first-line receivers” interpret and 
subsequently communicate this information influences perceptions of targets 
multiple iterations removed.199  Thus, order effects—the sequence in which 
individuals receive the information, and how initial recipients disseminate the 
information—are critical. Because the initial recipients of hazard information 
have particular power to impact public perceptions, high-level officials in 
government non-government organizations and agencies have enormous influence 
in filtering information for public consumption.200
G.  The Risk Decision Structure 
 Perceptions are one thing, behaviors are quite another.  As social science 
has amply demonstrated, beliefs do not always translate into action.201  As 
empirical studies have revealed, “attitudes need not be related to behaviors,202 and 
even if they are, they may be trailing rather than leading indicators. Indeed, 
psychology's self-perception theory tracks the ways in which people infer their 
198 The public outrage and concern following the Exxon Valdees Oil spill is one example of an 
environmental disaster that triggered widespread concern over the risks posed to human and 
wildlife health by oil tankers. See also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71, at 153-159. 
199 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 180.   
200 For a discussion of the role of government actors in responsible risk communication, see James 
O. Mason, The Federal Role in Risk Communication and Public Education in Effective Risk 
Communication 19 (Covello, V. T., McCallum, D. B, and Pavlova, M. T. eds., 1987)(“The 
government’s responsibility in risk communication is to help ensure that decision of public policy 
and personal practice are based on the nest available information.”) 
201 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 
86-88 (showing group members tend to ignore their own feelings when in a group and as a result 
riskier shifts occur in judgment) ; See also, John M. Darley, Bibb Latane, Bystander Intervention 
in Emergencies:  Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377 
(1968) (stating that rational and irrational fears about what might happen if they intervene, 
including physical harm, public embarrassment, involvement with police procedures, lost work 
days and jobs, and other unknown dangers, sometimes people from assisting in what they believe 
to be emergencies); See also, Rob Bond, Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-
Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN 111, 111-37 (1996)(analyzing famous study demonstrating that despite believing a line 
to be a certain length, when presented with the  option of conforming to statements of confederates 
most will do so at odds with their own beliefs); see also, Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of 
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 371-78 (1963) (demonstrating that despite 
an unwillingness to continue experiment and a belief that real harm was being done, subjects 
continued to be obedient to experimenter over these beliefs); see also, Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY MAGAZINE, 1971, at 84. (showing that individual beliefs and concerns may 
be cognitively ignored in situations where group cohesion and cooperation is more highly desired, 
leading to adverse consequences). 
202 Bond & Smith, supra note, at 111-37 (citing an experiment in which participants were asked to 
judge which line was longer after confederates had incorrectly stated their opinions.  In many 
situations the subjects conformed to the group’s incorrect statements, despite looking directly at 
the lines). 
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attitudes from their behavior ('If I'm doing this, it must be because I like it').”203
Whether members of the public take certain steps that would reasonably be 
predicted based upon their purported views involves a second set of analysis and 
determinations.  For example, Sunstein has pointed out that, as in the case of 
reputational cascades, often individuals act on other people’s perceptions—or at 
least champion the “common wisdom,” independent of their own private 
attitudes.204  A full analysis of public risk perception requires an examination of 
how the decision structure can influence the behavior outcome in light of the 
adopted view. 
 Risk perception is relevant for purposes of two categories of behavior-
based outcomes.  One is personal practice and the other is public policy.205  The 
former is an area where risk perception can (although it often doesn’t) directly 
influence exposure to a potential hazard.  The latter is influenced by public risk 
perception when the public puts pressure on policy makers to take action, in the 
form of legislation, regulation, or resource allocation, in order to influence 
perceived threats.206  In a strict dictatorship, absent a revolt or a coup, the 
discontent of the people will have little direct impact on how a government 
chooses to protect (or fail to protect) its citizens.  A well-functioning democracy, 
on the other hand, should be responsive to the wishes and needs of the 
populace.207  In the context of this type of political environment, public perception 
often—for good or for ill—impacts policy adoption.208  The political and power 
structure of a society becomes an important factor in whether the beliefs of the 
members of society translate to government action.  Even in the context of a 
203 Baruch Fischhoff & Ilya Fischhoff, Will They Hate Us? Anticipating Unacceptable Risks 3 
Risk Management, 7, 11 (2001). See also, Daryl J. Bem, Self Perception Theory, in 6 Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 1-574 (Leonard Berkowitz 1979); See also, Russel H. Fazio, Self-
Perception Theory: A Current Perspective, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: Ontario Symposium 129 
(Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, & C. Peter Herman eds. 1987); see also, Daryl J. Bem, Self-
Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, 74 PSYCHOL.
REV. 183, 183-200 (1967) ; see also, Walter B. Cannon, The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A 
Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory, 100 American Journal of Psychology 567, 567-
86 (1987) (emotions follow physical reactions, i.e., because my body is crying I must be sad). 
204 See generally, Sunstein,  LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95 at 67. 
205See Mason, supra note 179, at 19. (“The government’s responsibility in risk communication is 
to help ensure that decision of public policy and personal practice are based on the nest available 
information.”) 
206 See generally, Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71. 
207 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating “ . . . Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever 
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or 
to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principle and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and 
happiness . . . ”) 
208 See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010) 
(despite failure of tough on crime approach, politicians continue to ratchet up penalties for 
criminals despite mounting evidence that such practices do not work, in order to win votes from a 
public that perceives an increase in crime) ; See also Kahan, supra note 172, (demonstrating that 
new technologies, like stem cell research, may be hotly debated and stifled due to opposition from 
powerful cultural entities, in this case religious institutions and political parties). 
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genuine democracy, the translation of public belief to political action is imperfect, 
of course.  For one thing, democratic governments are rarely characterized as 
“efficient” law-making structures.209  For another, policy makers are influenced 
by the same variables as other members of society, and may be guided by a 
separate, if related set of biases.210  Both because the populace exerts pressure on 
lawmakers and because lawmakers are themselves members of the society, public 
risk perception is at the heart of risk policy decisions. 211  But to say this is not to 
suggest that the risk preferences of members of the population are routinely 
considered when risk decisions are made.  Rather, the public’s influence tends to 
surface in a random and haphazard fashion, such as when a particular risk is 
suddenly brought to light, or a particularly bad policy decision results in public 
outrage.212  The role of individual members of society need not be so limited.  
Members of the public are often as well equipped to evaluate hazards as are law 
and policy-makers, if given access to pertinent information; they possess a range 
of talents and education that might be relevant to such situations; and they are 
heavily invested in such choices.   
The foregoing list of considerations represents the collective focus of the 
various theoretical perspectives to date.  The model goes far in achieving insight 
into this area, but is not exhaustive.213  Risk is a sufficiently ubiquitous 
phenomenon that relevant inputs are almost endless, and theories regarding 
209 Forman, supra note 187, at 993. (public policy influenced by majority for election purposes 
leading to bad outcomes); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability 
and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (1988) (democracy 
inefficient because voters are ignorant, it suffers from procedural defects, there is a problem with 
majority tyranny, and it is too expensive, among other criticisms); see Whitford, Andrew B. and 
Lee, Soo-Young, The Efficiency and Inefficiency of Democracy in Making Governments 
Effective: Cross-National Evidence (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450743 (democracy may be inefficient for countries suffering 
from the “dictator/disorder” dilemma). 
210 See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
(Oxford 1992). 
211 See Khan, supra note 172(explaining that public policies often made to satisfy voters or 
unhappy sects rather than by sound logic and empirical evidence); See also Forman, supra note 
187, at 993; see also David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary 
Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315, 1329-30 (2003)(pointing out that lawmakers are influenced by 
public sentiment). 
212 An example of just such a situation was the response to Hurricane Katrina.  Prior to the 
destruction from the storm, the American public was largely unaware and uninformed about the 
risk presented by the potential for large-scale storms to create severe flooding conditions.  After 
August 29, 2005, when 80% of New Orleans was flooded, the media and lawmakers began to 
include public sentiment in the conversation.  See e.g. Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate 
Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Seas Levels: The Costs of 
Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 1127, 1157-97 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of public 
reaction to Hurricane Katrina for future government response to the problem of climate change); 
see also,News Hour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, Public Opinion After Katrina (Wednesday, August 
25) (“National polls are showing a drop in public support not only for President Bush, but also 
highlighting strong disapproval of governments at all levels in their response to Hurricane 
Katrina.”) 
213 See Appendix. 
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foundations and sources of concern are constantly evolving. 214 However, the 
factors listed here provide a solid starting point for a comprehensive discussion of 
antecedents to risk discernment among members of the public.   
IV. CATEGORIES OF FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK PERCEPTION
Individuals’ beliefs about risks are complex, and rarely can be accurately 
represented in simple terms.215  The public has a broad concept of risk that 
incorporates a wide variety of considerations.216 This intricate network of factors 
relevant to public risk perception has been contrasted with the formal risk 
management models which define riskiness based upon mortality and measured in 
probabilities.217  A careful method of examination of the risk perception 
scholarship and a distillation of the major factors empirically demonstrated to 
influence judgments about and responses to dangers yields a list of specific 
characteristics that can help predict when the public will become alarmed.  At this 
stage of the project, these factors are listed.  Their relative strength and level of 
influence of these factors is variable, and unquestionably depend upon the unique 
combination of factors making up the interaction in any given situation.218  This 
Article is designed to encourage future scholarship and commentary on public 
risk perception.  In addition, the model presented here has significant practical use 
for law and policy formation.  Understanding the particular antecedents to public 
anxiety can help risk managers make decisions that comport with public 
preferences.  Specifically, having a specific set of predictors can assist 
government officials in predicting when widespread concern will arise and in 
managing public risk responses.  
A. Priming or Inoculation 
One characteristic common to large segments of a population is the degree to 
which its members have been primed or inoculated regarding certain potential 
sources of danger.  Much risk-related priming occurs on a wide-scale basis 
because sources of information about risks and communication and experiences 
214 Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31, at 128. (discussing two different risk 
approaches to a single risk analysis; whether a product is reasonably safe). 
215 See generally, Robert E. O'Connor, Richard J. Bard, & Ann Fisher, Risk Perceptions, General 
Environmental Beliefs, and Willingness to Address Climate Change, 19 Risk Anal., 461 (2006) 
(discovering a complicated relationship between individuals’ general environmental beliefs and 
their willingness to advocate for prevention in the area of climate change). 
216 is possibly redundant to cite, since it was cited in the prior sentence in different wording 
217 See generally, Slovic supra note 35,  
218 Results from some studies demonstrate sensitivity to context and covarying features that 
increases the difficulty in making detailed global predictions.  See e.g., M.G. Morgan, Baruch 
Fischhoff, B., A. Bostrom, & C. Atman, RISK COMMUNICATION: THE MENTAL MODELS 
APPROACH (2001). 
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related to hazards reach a broad segment of society.219  Priming describes the 
phenomenon whereby exposure to a stimulus influences the response to a later 
stimulus.220  Certain primes or triggers can help to determine cognitive and 
affective—or emotion-base— reactions to later targets or events.221  In risk 
perception terms, early experiences influence subsequent reactions to potential 
hazards.222  The priming effect is based upon the fact that early impressions last. 
Put simply, impressions and preferences are sticky—and this is doubly so in the 
context of risk assessments.223  Priming has been discussed in terms of both 
cognitions and emotions.  Social psychologists have coined the phrase “cognitive 
priming” to describe the process whereby one idea or practice becomes associated 
with other ideas or practices.224  Priming is also an affect-based process.  The 
focus on affect as a powerful determinant in reactions to risk-related information 
has gained increasing attention in the legal and extra-legal scholarship.  Emotion 
is a powerful element of priming perceptions of future potential dangers, 
particularly when fear is induced.225
In the risk perception literature, priming of risk has been discussed as 
“signaling.”  Risk researchers have suggested that to the degree that an event is 
associated with a risk, that event can act as an important signal.226  Paul Slovic 
cites the disaster at Three Mile Island (TMI) as a striking example of an event 
219 For example, although personal exposures vary, Americans share the common experiences of 
Three Mile Island, the attacks of September 11 2001, and Hurricane Katrina.  American citizens 
tune into the same national nightly news and cable news outlets, receive information from the 
same major newspapers, and are protected by the same federal agencies. 
220 See Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, supra note 90, at 1023.  (“priming effects incorporate the 
notion of spreading activation, which posits that similar concepts are linked together in memory 
within a network of nodes and that activation of one concept results in the spreading of the 
activation along the network to other related concepts”). 
221 S.T. Murphy & Robert B. Lajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming with 
Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. Person. Soc. Psych. 723, 723 (1993) (finding 
that millisecond-long encounters with negative or positive stimuli can produce non-specific 
emotional reactions to unrelated stimuli, 
222 Fear has been empirically linked to priming effects wherein the salience of an earlier event 
influences or “primes” future perception of risks.  For an example of this phenomenon in the 
context of international environmental law, see Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Differences 
in the Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources, in The Political Economy of 
American Trade Policy 385, 434-437 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1996). 
223 See generally, D. A. Sherman et al., AFFECTIVE PERSEVERANCE: COGNITIONS 
CHANGE BUT PREFERENCES STAY THE SAME (1998).  See also, Paul Slovic, 
Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and 
Decision-Making, 1 Roger Williams L. Rev. 172 (2000) (hereinafter Slovic, 
Rational Actors) (discussing the perseverance of induced preferences).   
224 See Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, supra note 90, at 1015. (describing the influence of observed 
behavior in inducing like behavior). 
225 See Slovic, Rational Actors, supra note 220 at 172 (discussing studies demonstrating the role of 
affect in the formation of preference). See also,  Sherman et al., supra note; Robert B. Zajonc, 
Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING &
THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION, 31, 49-50 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) 
(suggesting that priming is almost entirely an affective process). 
226 See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 9. 
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with high signal potential.227  TMI did not result in any loss of human life, yet the 
impact of the accident was monumental.228  Widespread public fear and outrage 
occurred following the incident, resulting in serious consequences for the utility 
plant involved as well as increased regulations on the nuclear energy industry.229
The public viewed TMI as signaling the disaster and danger potential of nuclear 
reactor, and the accident primed a large segment of the population to react with 
fear and distrust to nuclear energy.230
Large scale alarm following an event like TMI makes perfect sense if one 
thinks about the public reaction as part of a learning process; once the public 
understood that an accident like TMI was possible, individuals were 
understandably fearful of the potential for future disasters at nuclear reactor 
plants.  However, the reaction to hazardous discoveries and events can be 
complex.  As Slovic points out: 
227 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 283. See also generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. 
supra note 4 .
228 The Washington Post has described the accident and the aftermath: 
Before the 1979 accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island, few had heard of 
the nuclear power plant on the Susquehanna River. But the crisis that began . . . in 
the early morning of March 28 quickly turned the plant and its giant cooling 
towers into icons in the long national argument over the safety of nuclear energy. 
The initial information from the accident in the Unit 2 reactor was sketchy and 
contradictory. The utility company that ran the plant said the situation was 
manageable. But officials from mayor's offices to the Oval Office worried about 
possible complications that would shower radioactivity on the small communities 
around Three Mile Island – or perhaps even farther. Government engineers feared 
that the reactor's nuclear fuel would melt out of its thick steel and cement 
encasement, or that a hydrogen gas bubble in the core would explode. 
In Harrisburg, less than 10 miles away, the state's new governor struggled with 
conflicting advice on whether to begin an evacuation that might affect more than 
600,000 people. In Washington, 100 miles south, federal regulators anxiously 
sought reliable information to guide local authorities and the president, former 
nuclear engineer Jimmy Carter. 
In the two decades since Three Mile Island, the plant has become a rallying 
symbol for the anti-nuclear movement. But the nuclear power industry, which has 
not built a single new plant in the United States since 1979, says the accident 
showed that its safety systems worked, even in the most extreme circumstances. 
Revelations during the decade-long cleanup of the crippled reactor showed that 
its core was more seriously damaged than originally suspected. But scientists still 
disagree on whether the radiation vented during the event was enough to affect the 
health of those who lived near the plant.  
20 Years Later: A Nuclear Nightmare in Pennsylvania The Washington Post, Mark 
Stencel,  March 27, 1999 (found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/tmi/tmi.htm) (last visited, July 10, 2009). 
229 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 283. 
230 Id. This growing skepticism and anxiety over nuclear power altered the future of the industry in 
the United States.  “A federal investigation, assigning blame to human, mechanical, and design 
errors, recommended changes in reactor licensing and personnel training, as well as in the 
structure and function of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The accident also increased public 
concern over the dangers of nuclear power . . .” Three Mile Island, Columb. Encyclopedia, Sixth 
Edition. (2008) (http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-ThreeMil.html) (last visited, July 10, 
2009). 
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An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little social disturbance 
. . . if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (such as a train 
wreck).  However, a small accidence in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived 
as poorly understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA 
laboratory, may have an immense social consequences if it is perceived as a 
harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.231
Undoubtedly, certain characteristics of the risk help to determine its signal 
potential.  In the case of TMI, the involuntariness, unfamiliarity, and potential for 
catastrophe created the perfect storm.  Such features of the risk (discussed in 
detail below) are important not only for initial perceptions of an incident, but also 
determine whether an incident will prime or signal the population, creating lasting 
attitudes about certain classes of activities.   
B. Features of the Risk 
Three Mile Island is a classic example of how certain features of a 
circumstance can signal danger to the public.  Another example is the fear of 
terrorism following September 11, 2001 (“9/11”).  Although TMI and the attacks 
of 9/11 were different in many respects, with respect to priming fear, TMI and 9-
11 shared some important features.  They were both sudden and unexpected.  
They were both accompanied by vivid images of destruction.232  The risks from 
terrorism and from the meltdown of a nuclear reactor are risks that are beyond the 
control of the average U.S. citizen. These examples are stunning illustrations of 
how powerful certain risk characteristics can be in shaping public perceptions.  As 
central as these  features of the risk situation were in explaining widespread fear, 
these characteristics are not important considerations for traditional risk 
management decisions, which tend to be focused on quantitative assessments of 
likelihood and consequences. 
The psychometric approach has been most instrumental in identifying 
features of an activity most likely to cause concern.233  Empirical work using 
survey materials have asked respondents to rank or rate activities for their 
riskiness and have then asked respondents to judge the activities along various 
dimensions.  Results typically consist of perceptions of riskiness of a variety of 
activities and corresponding characterizations of each of the activities.234  For 
231 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283. 
232 It is important to note that the TMI imagery was communicated through descriptions of 
“nuclear meltdown,” “raining radioactive material,” and “the explosion of a hydrogen bubble.”  
The vivid images were never, fortunately, witnessed.  In contrast, the images of death and 
destruction from 9-11 were real, devastating, witnessed by millions, and still widely available in 
digital photo and video archives.  See e.g., www.september11news.com/AttackImages.htm; 
http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/shattered/; http://revver.com/video/59686/september-11-
2001-what-we-saw/ (all last visited, Mar. 10, 2010). 
233 Empirical work on risk characteristics is referred to, collectively, as the psychometric study of 
risk perception.  See Section I supra.
234 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280. 
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example, one of the most important early psychometric studies on risk perception 
asked respondents to evaluate thirty activities and technologies with respect to the 
perceived benefit to society; the perceived risk, the acceptability of the current 
level of risk; and the risk’s position on each of nine dimensions of risk.235  Later 
surveys expanded the survey to add dimensions and revised the methodology.  
Psychometric survey data has revealed some interesting patterns about the 
risks about which people are particularly concerned and the characteristics that 
trigger special consideration in risk perception.  Respondents tend to evaluate a 
risk based upon factors such as how well the risk is understood, how controllable 
the risk is, and the type of emotion triggered by the harm.236   Specifically, the 
early work of Fischhoff and colleagues found that “people are influenced by 
whether a risk is potentially catastrophic, faced by future generations, 
involuntarily incurred, uncontrollable, delayed rather than immediate, and 
particularly dreaded.”237  Paul Slovic, another pioneer in the psychometric 
method, has similarly noted that “perception of risk is greater for hazards whose 
adverse effects are uncontrollable, dread (sic), catastrophic, fatal rather than 
injurious, not offset by compensating benefits, and delayed in time so the risks are 
borne by future generations.”238  Slovic and his colleagues have grouped risk 
features into two broader categories: the dread risk factor and the unknown risk 
factor.239  The dread risk factor includes the degree to which respondents 
experience feelings of dread or calm in response to the risk, the perceived 
voluntary or involuntary assumption of the risk, the extent to which the risk is 
controllable or uncontrollable, and whether or not the risk is judged to have 
catastrophic effects.240   The dread factor is directly related to the role of affect in 
risk perception, which is discussed in detail below.  The unknown risk factor 
includes characteristics such as whether the risk is familiar or unfamiliar to the 
target, known or unknown to science, and novel or old.241  Several of these key 
characteristics of risks merit a more detailed discussion.242
1. Controllability 
235 See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 9. 
236 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 282. 
237 See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31. 
238 Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 190. 
239 Slovic’s work, in particular, identified two main cognitive factors which dominate individuals’ 
perception of risk. See generally, Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2. 
240 Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note, 2 at 1997 (“A risk is dreaded to the extent it is perceived to be 
uncontrollable, involuntary and potentially catastrophic in its consequences.”) 
241 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 281-83.. 
242 The 1978 Fischhoff et al. study asked respondents to rate risks according to the following 
criteria: 1. Voluntariness of risk; 2. Immediacy of effect; 3. Knowledge about risk by the targets; 
4. Knowledge about risk to science; 5. Control over risk; 6. Newness of risk; 7. Chronic versus 
catastrophic; 8. Common versus dreaded (“Is this a risk that people have learned to live with and 
can think about reasonably calmly, or is it one that people have great dread for-on the level of a 
gut reaction?”); 9. Severity of consequences (“How likely is it that the consequence will be 
fatal?”). See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 130. 
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The feeling of control is an important influence on human behavior.243
When individuals perceive that they have control over events, they experience 
less fear.244  Conversely, risks over which people perceive that they have little 
influence are likely to be viewed as more dangerous and less acceptable.245
Examples of uncontrollable hazards include airplane crashes, dangers from 
electric power, and harms from transport of hazardous materials.246  As Slovic 
notes, “motor vehicle accidents are much less dreaded because people think they 
can control their vulnerability (‘It won't happen to me because I drive more safely 
than most people’)” 247  In sum, “perceived lack of control is a key factor behind 
high risk perception . . .”248
The control issue becomes important in particular contexts.249
Environment and technology risks tend to be seen as not under one's control.  
These types of hazards are viewed as primarily the responsibility of the 
government.250 Lifestyle risks, on the other hand, are judged to be a matter of 
personal responsibility. 251  Risk perception can also vary, depending upon who is 
surveyed.  Certain subgroups within a population seem to be less risk averse, a 
fact that may be related to the fact that these same groups have a greater measure 
of power and control in society generally.252
2. Familiarity 
The public is less concerned about risks that are familiar (such as 
household accidents) than they are about risks that are unfamiliar (such as nuclear 
waste).253  This fact illustrates the principle that familiarity with a given risk 
mediates public fear and judgments about the appropriate public response to the 
hazard.254  The “unknown’ risk factor includes characteristics such as known–
unknown to the individual, known–unknown to science, and new–old.255
243 George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 Organizational 
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 272, 274 (1996) 
244 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283. (“expressed preference studies have shown that other 
(perceived) characteristics such as familiarity, control…and level of knowledge also seem to 
inflouence the relation between perceived rsk, perceived benefit, and risk acceptance”) 
245 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 282. (example of psychometric data) 
246  Loewenstein, supra note , at 274.  
247 Paul Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Protective Behavior, in Taking 
Care: Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior 14 (Neil D. Weinstein ed., 1987). 
248 Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 988. 
249 Lennart Sjöberg, The Different Dynamics of Personal and General Risk, Risk Management, 19, 
27 (2003)[hereinafter Sjöberg, Different Dynamics].
250 Id. at 19-34.  
251 Id.,at 31.  
252 Slovic, supra note 35, at 59 (Explaining less risk aversion in white males versus non-white 
males and women this way: “Perhaps white males see less risk in the world because they create, 
manage, control, and benefit from many of the major technologies and activities.”) 
253  Frank Baker, Risk Communication about Environmental Hazards  11  J. of Pub. Health Pol., 
341, 346 (1990). 
254 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 , at  178. 
255 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280. 
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Familiarity has been linked to affective components of risk perception, such as 
dread—or more informally—fear and anxiety.256 The familiarity effect is likely 
related to illusion of control, a cognitive bias that leads individuals to perceive 
that they have more control over their own fates and external events than they 
really do.257  When potential harms are familiar, people have the sense that 
knowledge of the factors leading to the harm and the effects of the harm, better 
position them to prevent the harm.258 There is clearly something to this sentiment.  
When people understand risk factors, they are better able to educate themselves 
about prevention, and are better prepared to prevent the harm.  Of course, in order 
to avoid the dangers, knowledge must lead to effective action.  Regardless, human 
beings prefer to suffer ailments that are known than those whose course and 
outcomes are unpredictable.259
Importantly, familiarity can have contradictory effects, at times increasing 
perceptions of the likelihood of risk.  When a danger is cognitively “available,” 
people will be more likely to be able to bring instances to mind, and will therefore 
judge the danger to be common or likely to occur in the future.260  The rule of 
thumb that leads people to believe that something is more likely if they can 
readily bring to mind relevant examples is the aforementioned availability 
heuristic.  Therefore, an unfamiliar threat, particularly if it is connected with a 
new, complex technology that is not well understood, may create more anxiety 
than a more common threat, the parameters of which are relatively well known.261
However, very common and familiar dangers are often associated with more 
recent or frequent examples, heightening perception of associated harms.262
Ultimately, members of the public are least fearful of harms that are sufficiently 
familiar so as not to trigger a special fear associated with ambiguous and 
potentially disastrous outcomes, but not so familiar so as to be featured repeatedly 
256 Baker, supra note , at 346, 352. (noting circumstances and relationships between risks that are 
familiar and dreaded in regard to public preference) 
257  Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280.
258 See Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters, Donald G. MacGregor, Melissa L. Finucane, Affect, Risk, and 
Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35-S40, S36 (2005) ( “while people may be able to ‘do 
the right thing’ without analysis (e.g. dodge a falling object) it is unlikely that they can use 
analytic thinking rationally without guidance from affect…[which] is essential to rational action.”) 
259 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283. (examine fig. 2 demonstrating that generally people 
desire more regulation and protection from unknown risks as opposed to known risks) 
260 See generally, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (discussing the availability heuristic, among other 
heuristics and biases). 
261 See Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, supra note , at 86. (fig 1 and 2 showing that the most 
feared risks included the unknown and new technology, e.g. nuclear power, nuclear weapons, 
nerve gas, and DNA research) 
262 For instance, one study involved showing individuals a list of well-known men and women, 
and whether male or female names appeared more frequently.  Respondents’ judgments regarding 
frequency were directly influenced by the relative fame individuals associated with the names.  
When shown lists featuring well-known men  but not well known women, respondents believed 
that men’s names appeared more frequently.   However, when presented with lists in which the 
women were the more famous, people judged women’s names to appear more often.   
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in the media or in public discourse.   Harms such as diabetes, asthma, and obesity 
have been cited as examples of dangers that exact a toll in terms of human health 
and morbidity far greater than that which would be suggested by the public’s 
professed concern.263
3. Voluntariness 
 People are particularly frightened by risks that are involuntary.264  The 
extent to which risks associated with an activity are voluntarily assumed was one 
of the earliest hypothesized influences on risk judgments.265  Early psychometric 
investigations reinforced the idea that voluntarily assumed risks are more 
palatable to the public and judged to be less problematic than non-voluntary 
hazards by a large margin.266  The voluntariness quality is related to the issue of 
control, and reinforces the notion that when members of the public perceive that 
they have control over exposure to potential harms, they are less fearful.267  The 
prevalence of the voluntariness characteristic of risk in risk perception scholarship 
points to its robust influence on the public’s normative judgments about harms. 268
Certain theoretical perspectives place particular emphasis on this 
characteristic.  One example is the “revealed preferences” theory, which 
advocates an historical examination of the use of certain technologies to gauge the 
acceptability of certain risks and risk characteristics.269  According to Chauncey 
Starr’s research, individuals appear willing to accept risks posed by voluntary 
activities (e.g., skiing, driving a car, traveling by commercial jet) about 1000 
times greater than they would tolerate from involuntary sources (e.g., food 
preservatives, nuclear energy, natural disasters) that provide the same level of 
benefit.270  Slovic and his colleagues, using a non-historical, survey methodology, 
found that respondents preferred somewhat higher risk levels for voluntary, as 
263 Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1016 (2003) 
(noting the relative lack of concern among Americans over health risks stemming from obesity); 
see also Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Experimental Psychol.: 
Human Learning and Memory 551 (1978)(noting that certain causes of death (accidents, 
homicides, tornadoes, fires, and cancer) were relatively overestimated, while others (stroke, 
diabetes, tuberculosis, asthma) were underestimated. 
264 See Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 83.  
265 Chauncey Starr posited that the public accepts will accept a risk that is 1000 greater when the 
risk is voluntarily assumed versus when the danger is imposed upon individuals. Starr, supra note 
45, at 1232-38.    
266 See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 143.  
267 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283 (noting that “hazards judged to be ‘voluntary’ tend 
also to be judged as ‘controllable.’”) 
268 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 , at 178.  See also, Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, supra note 3, at 83.  
269 Starr, supra note 45 at 1283 (“Several major features of the benefit- risk relations are apparent, 
the most obvious being the difference by several orders of magnitude in society's will- ingness to 
accept "voluntary" and "in- voluntary" risk. As one would expect, we are loathe to let others do 
unto us what we happily do to ourselves.”) 
270Starr, supra note 45 at 1283. 
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opposed to involuntary activities.271  Although Starr’s initial estimates of 
preference for voluntary risks appear high (a survey of studies has revealed that 
voluntary risks are preferred by a factor of 100 to 1000) choice in exposure to risk 
remains an important factor in risk analysis. 272
4. Catastrophic Potential 
Whether the risk carries with it the potential for catastrophe is another 
important consideration.273  A definition of “catastrophic” is the potential to affect 
many people simultaneously.274  Research has revealed that respondents are less 
tolerant of risks carrying the potential for catastrophe than traditional risk analysis 
or “rational theory” would predict.  Specifically, individuals would prefer a 
certain loss of a relatively small number of lives over a period of years than a 
small risk of a large number of lives at a single point in time.275 Risks with 
catastrophic potential are reportedly perceived by the public as up to fifty times 
more risky than non-catastrophic risks.  Moreover, surveys have revealed that 
voluntary risks are preferred by a factor of 100 to 1000.276  This may also be 
related to the issue of perceived control and status quo.277  The “natural” state of 
affairs is more similar to a small loss of a number of lives over an extended period 
of time.  Human beings suffer various ailments that compromise health and 
shorten lives due to familiar causes like heart disease, cancer, liver disease, 
diabetes, respiratory disease and accidents.  Although death by these means is no 
less tragic than death by other means, members of the public are used to loss of 
life through these means.  In contrast, catastrophic loss involving sudden loss of 
multiple lives strike individuals as particularly upsetting.278  Examples of such 
catastrophic losses include those incurred following plane crashes, explosions, 
and natural disasters.  Because they are fairly rare, they are unfamiliar, and 
because they result in multiple lives lost, they induce a level of fear that is out of 
proportion with the level of fear that would be predicted by standard rational 
choice theory.279  Risks assumed on an individual level, such as those posed by 
cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and driving a motor vehicle are judged 
271 Id. 
272 D. Litai et al., The Public Perception of Risk, in THE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL VERSUS PERCEIVED 
RISKS 213, 219 (Vincent T. Covello et al. eds., 1981). 
273 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178. 
274). Sunstein, American Reactions, supra note 160, at 506.  
275 This tendency is irrational because it means that under certain circumstances, people will 
choose an option that results in a greater statistical loss of life. This expressed preference is at odds 
with our general understanding of attitudes about risk.  
276 Litai et al., supra note at  219. 
277 See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280-85. 
278 List of Disasters by year, including the highly publicized 2010 Oil Spill, can be found at 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001437.html (last visited, July 14, 2010). 
279 See Section II infra.
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as less fear-inducing in part because the consequences of such risks are seldom 
catastrophic.280
 Another characteristic of risk that is related to catastrophic potential is the 
reversibility of associated harms.  Not surprisingly, individuals are more 
concerned about risks they perceive to have long-term and potentially irreversible 
effects.281  The qualities of being catastrophic and being irreversible have been an 
indication for the need to take extra precautions for countries and governments no 
less than individuals.282 The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development asserts: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”283  Calls to replace traditional risk analysis have 
integrated these concerns over the potential for an increasing pace of 
technological ingenuity to outpace careful investigation and understanding of 
potential effects having irreversible consequences, with implications for current 
and future generations.284
5. Equity 
Less ubiquitous, but still present in the psychometric literature is the 
concern citizens have regarding the potential for inequitable distribution of risks.  
Particularly prevalent is the worry that historically disadvantaged members of the 
population are disproportionately exposed to harms.   The unequal exposure to 
risk of a particular identifiable population may trigger outrage and indignation, 
280 Torbjorn Rundmoj, Associations Between Affect and Risk Perception 5 J. of Risk Res., 119, 
134 (2002). 
281 Fischhoff & Fischhoff, supra note , at  11. 
282 “When a harm is irreversible, and when regulators lack information about its magnitude and 
likelihood, they should purchase an “option” to prevent the harm at a later date--the Irreversible 
Harm Precautionary Principle. This principle brings standard option theory to bear on 
environmental law and risk regulation. And when catastrophic outcomes are possible, it makes 
sense to take special precautions against the worst-case scenarios--the Catastrophic Harm 
Precautionary Principle.” Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841, 
841 (2006)[hereinafter Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic]
283 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 
I) (Jan. 1, 1993), quoted in Bjórn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real 
State of the World 348 (2001). 
284 See Bruna Di Marchi, Public Participation in Risk Governance, 30 Sci. & Pub. Pol, 171, 174 
(2003)(“To this end, progress is necessary in constructing new methods of decision-making, 
which include not only revised structures, but also innovative modes of thinking, communicating, 
and interacting. In this context, risk governance is to be conceived in more inclusive terms than the 
usual dichotomy risk assessment/ risk management.  As past experience has shown, catastrophic 
and often irreversible effects of (old and new) technologies might be anticipated.”)(internal 
citation omitted).  
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depending upon the history and perceived vulnerability of the group.285 Beck 
draws parallels between the modern allocation of risk and outcome with 
“legitimate” methods of wealth distribution.286  Risks, like resources, posses the 
characteristic of profoundly affecting quality of life, and, like resources, risks are 
virtually never uniformly distributed across all segments of society.287
Differences will be particularly acute in populations that share a history of 
discrimination with respect to risk exposure.288  Dangers threaten the lives, health, 
and property of members of society, but they may also jeopardize psychological 
security, freedoms, and interpersonal relationships.289  Nowhere is this more 
relevant than in situations in which members of society are systematically and 
disproportionately subjected to particular types of risks.290  A prominent example 
is the environmental justice movement, where a rising tide of concern and unrest 
has led to efforts to reshape environmental policy.291
Publications written for risk management professionals or for 
governmental agencies, commonly caution against ignoring potentially 
discriminatory practices and selective protection.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency, for example, has published material suggesting that much of the debate 
over environmental degradation has been related to questions of who has power to 
effect decisions, and how this might implicate issues of fairness and equality.  
This work provides specific advice based on the work of various risk perception 
experts.292  The EPA has endorsed the systematic examination of potentially 
unequal exposure to pollutants across various disadvantaged communities.293
285 Examples of perceived inequity can often be found by examining various media outlets.  (See 
e.g., African American man accuses president of not caring about black people in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, 
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Rapper_Kanye_West_denounces_Bush_response,_American_media_
at_hurricane_relief_telethon  ; Article detailing race and Hurricane Katrina, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/03/katrina/main814623.shtml (last visited, July 14, 
2010)  
286 Beck, supra note 9, at 19. 
287 Id. at 41 (“. . . there is a systematic ‘attraction’ between extreme poverty and extreme risk.”) 
288 African American man accuses president of not caring about black people in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, 
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Rapper_Kanye_West_denounces_Bush_response,_American_media_
at_hurricane_relief_telethon  ; Article detailing race and Hurricane Katrina, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/03/katrina/main814623.shtml
289 For a discussion of the potential impacts on human well-being and social structures posed by 
risks, see Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
290 See Beck, supra note 9, at 23   (discussing “social risk positions”). 
291 See generally Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice 
Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 508 
(2000) (detailing the ways in which the community-based environmental justice movement has 
influenced environmental research and policy). 
292 P. M. Sandman, Explaining Environmental Risk. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Toxic Substances, (1986).  See also, BARRY L. JOHNSON, IMPACT OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE ON HUMAN HEALTH: HAZARD, HEALTH EFFECTS, EQUITY, AND 
COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 33 (1999). 
293 See, e.g., 2 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All 
Communities 31-36 (1992); 
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Widespread concern over inequalities in environmental protections has led to 
organizing efforts in order to heighten awareness and advance more progressive 
policies and practices.294
C. Cultural and Personal Identity Factors 
 Cultural approaches to risk perception and assessment have had two 
general foci.  The first is the role of different identified “worldviews” on the 
individual’s experience of risk.295 The second is on the role of emotion (or affect) 
on risk perception.296  The idea that culture-based studies identify individual 
differences that might influence risk perception may seem incongruous, given that 
the study of culture is usually conceived of socially cultivated understandings 
common to a group of people.297  However, the importance of an individual’s 
worldview is a common emphasis in the cultural definition of risk response, so 
that individual variations in worldviews assume relevance for purposes of risk 
evaluations.298  Emotional reactions to dangers are then viewed as expressions of 
these individually held but culturally derived values and norms.299
1. Emotions  
Significant debate has centered on the question of whether emotions play an 
adaptive or maladaptive role in risk evaluation has generated substantial debate.300
There are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The 
analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, 
formal logic, and risk assessment. This system is relatively slow, effortful, and 
294 One example was the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, which 
was 
held in Washington, DC. in 1991.   For this and other examples, see SECOND NATIONAL 
PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSIHP SUMMIT: Celebrating Our Victories, 
Strengthening Our Roots (found at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/summit2/%20EJTimeline.pdf)(last 
visited, Mar. 20, 2010).  See also, Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It: Environmental 
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001 (1993); Robert 
D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Politics of Pollution: Implications for the Black 
Community, 47 Phylon 71, 78 (1986). 
295 See Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, supra note , at 1072. (“growing body of work suggests 
that cultural worldviews permeate all of the mechanisms through which individuals apprehend 
risk, including their emotional appraisals of putatively dangers activities, their comprehension and 
retention of empirical information, and their disposition to trust competing sources of risk 
information.”) 
296 Although the terms “emotion” and “affect” have received disparate treatment, particularly in 
the psychological literature, for the present purposes, they will be referenced interchangeably.  
There is some precedent for using these terms in this fashion.  
297 See Section I, supra.  
298 Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, supra note , at 1072.  
299 Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, supra note , at 1072. 
300 Id. 
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requires conscious control.301 The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly 
automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness.302 The experiential 
system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and 
remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies 
on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling 
that something is good or bad).303 This system represents risk as a feeling that 
tells us whether it's safe to walk down a dark street or drink strange-smelling 
water.304
Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as 
across-the-board irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and 
the experiential systems of individuals operate in parallel, and each seems to 
depend on the other for guidance.305 Studies have demonstrated that analytic 
reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect.306
According to Slovic, 
Various studies demonstrate that affect is a strong conditioner of preference, 
whether or not the cause of that affect is consciously perceived. They also 
demonstrate the independence of affect from cognition, indicating that there may 
be conditions of affective or emotional arousal that do not necessarily require 
cognitive appraisal. This affective mode of response, unburdened by cognition 
and hence much faster, has considerable adaptive value.307
Judgments of potential sources of harms are highly correlated with emotional 
valence, as measured by respondent ratings on scales such as good/bad, 
nice/awful, and dread/not dread.308  These empirical results suggest the 
importance not only of analytic evaluations of an activity or a technology, but also 
of affective reactions to that activity.  While some have argued that emotions are 
simply a byproduct of reason-based decisions about risk,309 this possibility has 
been largely refuted by findings suggesting that emotional reactions come first, 
and that effortful reasoning processes supplement or justify initial affective 
301 See Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor, Risk as Analysis 
and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality 24 Risk Anal, 2 
(2004). 
302 See Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, supra note , 
303 See Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, supra note  
304  Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, supra  note ;See Nussbaum, supra note , at 20. See 
also, George F. Loewenstein, Christopher K. Hsee, Elke U. Webster, & Ned Welch, Risk as 
Feelings, 127 Psychological Bulletin 267 (2001)(proposing an alternative theoretical perspective, 
the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of 
decision making).  
305 See Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, supra note ,  
306 See Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, supra note  
307 See Slovic, Rational Actors, supra note 220 at 172. 
308 Early psychometric studies of risk perception (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987). Those 
studies showed that feelings of dread were the major determinant of public perception and 
acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards. 
309 See generally, Kahan, supra note 82. 
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reactions.310   Moreover, emotion-based evaluations can lead to optimal decision-
making.  Findings from psychological studies on choice formation suggest that 
decision-makers often optimize outcomes when they stick with initial “gut” 
judgments. 311   Analyzing costs and benefits of various courses of action can lead 
to decisions that people later regret, and those that are inconsistent with later 
behavior and preferences.312
Even if emotions do not consistently serve as optimal cues for risk-
decision purposes, they may serve as signals for personal beliefs that have 
enormous value to the human-being who holds them.313  The value of affective 
reactions is explicit in the “cultural evaluator” model advanced by Dan Kahan.  
The cultural evaluator model of risk perception views emotional responses to risk 
as reflective of an individual’s culturally defined, expressive evaluation of 
potential dangers.314  According to Kahan, “When people draw on their emotions 
to judge the risk that such an activity poses, they form an expressively rational 
attitude about what it would mean for their cultural worldviews for society to 
credit the claim that that activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation ....”315
The cultural evaluator model rejects both the neoclassical economic rational actor 
model (which claims that risk decisions involve analytical optimization strategies) 
and the behavioral-decision-theory model (which views emotions as biases). 316
Instead of taking a pessimistic view of affect, cultural risk theory views 
emotion as signaling underlying values, which themselves have worth.317 In sum, 
“emotional responses to risk can be understood as tools, guiding the individual 
toward decisions that serve deeply held values and preferences . . . “it is not, after 
all, irrational for members of society to care about meanings and not just about 
consequences, and to form positions on risk that express their cultural values.”318
As Kahan points out, “individuals' decisions to forgo or forbear risks is based not 
on the expected utility of those actions but on their social meanings, which are 
unlikely to be tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those 
310 See Slovic, Rational Actors, supra note 220 at 172. 
311 See Timothy D. Wilson, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE 
UNCONSCIOUS 170 (1998). 
312 Id.  The fact that affective responses have a useful function in risk response does not mean that 
emotions never prevent optimal decision-making.  Unquestionably, emotions can prevent 
consideration of all relevant factors in a decision-making situation or can cause individuals to rush 
to judgment.  Moreover, because emotions are so prevalent in risk decisions, people are especially 
vulnerable to manipulation by parties with vested interests who use emotional appeals or fear 
tactics to motivate future judgments.  See Wilson, supra note 166, at 701. 
313 See Martha C. Nussbaum, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19 
(2001) (“Emotions... involve judgments about important things... in which, appraising an external 
object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness 
before parts of the world that we do not fully control.”)   
314 See generally, Kahan, supra note 82. 
315 Id. at 741. 
316 See Kahan, supra note 82, at 749 (“ . . . the cultural evaluator theory…offers a very different 
account of how…emotions enter the cognition of risk…than the irrational weigher theory”) 
317See Kahan, supra note 82, at 751.  
318 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally Emotional Public, 54 
ST. LOUIS L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2010). See also, Kahan, supra note 82, at 758. 
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risks.”319  Emotions are highly dependent upon other features of the risk 
context.320  When there is a known, hated perpetrator, when there is an act that is 
outrageous, there will be more agitation, perhaps not out of fear per se, but out of 
a hybrid of fear and loathing for the source of the fear.321  A recent example from 
American history is Osama Bid Laden.322
2. Cultural Worldviews 
There are two ways of categorizing characteristics of the risk perceiver.  
The first is based upon demographic information.323 The second involves what 
cultural risk scholars call cultural worldview typology.324  Proponents of this 
typology believe that a person’s risk preferences are guided by their moral or 
philosophical approach to the world. 325 By defining people as high or low on 
control (grid) and social commitment (group), the cultural worldview typology 
makes certain predictions about how individuals will form judgments about a 
wide range of potential dangers.326
 Members of society who have hierarchic orientations tend to accept risks, 
provided that the risk is legitimated by governmental authorities or other 
authoritarian experts; however, they are deeply distrustful of risks that threaten 
the social order.327  Egalitarians, on the other hand, are presumed to reject risks 
that are imposed by a small group on a large group, particularly when the 
imposition is by those in authority and when effects will affect future 
generations.328 Fatalists have low sympathy for group attachment, but a strong 
orientation toward socially assigned classifications, and Individualists tend to 
reject social structures and group attachment.329  Orientation toward the group is 
hypothesized to have profound influences on risk perception.330  Individual 
worldviews might also interact with risk characteristics.  For example, there is 
319  Kahan, supra note 82, at 754.  
320 Kahan, supra note 82, at 741,  
321 Id. 
322 See Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects of 
Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. Behav. Decision Making 311, 315-16 (2005) (discussing the 
common urge to exact revenge upon identifiable wrong-doers). 
323 See Mary Douglas, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54-68 (1970). 
324 See id. at 54-68.  
325 See id.
326 See Doughlas & Wildavsky, supra note 92; see also Suzanne Rippl, Cultural Theory and Risk 
Perception: A Proposal for a Better Measurement, 5 J. of Risk Res. 5 147, 149 (2002).  
327 See generally, Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 92. 
328 See Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 92, at 126. (“those organized on voluntaristic, 
egalatarian principles will make the sectarian selection of risks and justify their view of 
danger…”). 
329Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 92 at 99, 101; see also, Rippl, supra note at 150.  
330 See Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S. 
Krimsky & D. Goldin eds., 1992). 
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some thought that personality variables influence an individual’s degree of 
concern over the potential for catastrophic outcomes generally.331
3. Self-Relevance 
One unsurprising finding is that the more relevant a particular hazard is to 
a certain subgroup, the more concern members of that group express about that 
risk.  For example, research has found that age-related illnesses are particularly 
feared by respondents of advanced age.332  Certain populations within a society 
assign higher importance to some risks than other groups based upon a shared 
vulnerability to associated risks.333 Such groups often mobilize in an attempt to 
gain attention and resources for the adoption of risk reduction in areas the group 
perceives as important for one reason or another.334  One category of risk that is 
particularly likely to be relevant to large segments of the population is those risks 
likely to be catastrophic in nature.335 The self-relevance feature may help to 
explain why catastrophic risks (or those risks perceived as catastrophic) are more 
likely to cause wide-spread panics.336  A lack of perceived self-relevance may 
also explain why some serious risks receive surprisingly little attention.  An 
example is climate change.337  Until recently, climate change received relatively 
little public attention.   Climate change is a harm that is hard to experience 
personally.  No doctor will diagnose a patient with “climate change” and give the 
patient six months to live.  Because natural disasters tend to be localized, it can be 
difficult to connect dramatic weather events (which do have relevance to 
members of the population) with global climate change. 
D. Additional Relevant Features of the Risk Context 
 A number of additional aspects of the risk situation are relevant in 
predicting which types of harms will cause individuals particular anxiety.  These 
features do not fit easily into the aforementioned categories, and yet they are 
331 “Egalitarians, for example, are predicted to be more concerned about large-scale environmental 
risks with potentially catastrophic consequences such as nuclear power and ozone depletion, 
whereas individualists would consider these risks to have been exaggerated, and hierarchists 
should be most concerned about social issues such as mugging and terrorism which threaten their 
sense of order and security.” Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan, supra note 4 at 640.   For more on 
the cultural view, see Aaron Wildavsky and Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears 
What and Why?. 119, Risk 41 (1990). 
332 Id.
333 See Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, supra note 262. 
334 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178 (“various groups present competing 
evidence based upon their own perceptions and social agenda.”) id.
335 Id.s
336 Sunstein, Irrevesible and Catastrophic, supra note 262, at 841; see also, Kasperson, Renn, 
Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at  178.   
337 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 282 (discussing how the risk of auto accidents is routinely 
underestimated). 
CULTURE & RISK  55
significant considerations and germane to any attempt to construct an effective 
risk-perception prediction model. 
1. Benefits of Activity / Cost of Precautions  
Traditional risk analysis featured the benefits associated with a potentially 
harmful activity as a central consideration.  Later attempts to determine social 
acceptability also made benefits a pivotal feature of risk assessment.338  Although 
experts who engage in cost-benefit analysis diverge from the public substantially 
with respect to some criteria for risk response, both experts and members of the 
public care about the benefit associated with a risk.  Ultimately, the public will 
accept more risk for activities that are more beneficial.339   Conversely, if 
individuals perceive that they will have to make personal sacrifices in order to 
reduce the chance of a potential danger materializing, they may well profess less 
concern about the danger. 340  The importance of realized benefits to the 
acceptability of risks may be captured at least indirectly by the measure of 
voluntariness.341   As Frank Cross points out, “The voluntary acceptance of risk 
helps ensure that the same group incurs both the risk and the benefit of an activity 
(otherwise the community bearing the risk is unlikely to voluntarily accept it). An 
involuntarily borne risk, by contrast, may compel one group to accept the risk, 
while others benefit.342
2. Concreteness or Cognitive Availability 
 Behavioral researchers call the human tendency to “place more weight on 
concrete, emotionally interesting information than on more probative abstract 
data” as the vividness bias.343  As previously mentioned, vivid language is 
frequently used to evoke emotions and increase cognitive recall, making the 
technique of using dramatic examples and detailed descriptions common in a 
variety of forums and for a range of purposes.   The European Union, for 
338 Starr, supra note 45. 
339Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 8, at 148-50; see also, Susan Hadden, Public 
Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 Risk Analysis 47, 48 (1991).  
340“To the extent that people understand that they are themselves contributors to climate change, 
they are inclined to diminish the magnitude of the threat.”  Sunstein, American Reactions, supra 
note 160, at 532.  
341 Susan G. Hadden, A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO KNOW 137 (1989) (noting public use of risk as “a 
much richer concept that involves balancing benefits against unwanted outcomes and also involves 
some sense of the fairness of the activities that create the risk”); see also, Frank B. Cross, The 
Public Role in Risk Control, 24 Envtl. L. 887, 926 (1994)(“An activity with substantial perceived 
benefits will, on balance, be considered to be less risky. Because the risk appears more 
worthwhile, it consequently seems less great.”)  
342 Id. at 915. 
343 See Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55-61 (1980) 
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example, has required cigarette packages to feature images of diseased lungs.344
Other similar campaigns have been launched and promulgated with substantial aid 
from such methods.345
Certain types of occurrences provide fertile ground for subsequent vivid 
accounts.  Dramatic environmental events, such as natural disasters, have received 
the lion’s share of attention, while other, arguably more harmful environmental 
processes have gone relatively unnoticed.346   The visual impact and subsequent 
mental imagery of a danger influences the cognitive availability of a risk.  Some 
risks lend themselves to cognitive indelibility.  For example, “the impact of seeing 
a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater 
than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.”347
The vividness bias and the availability heuristic are related, in that vivid 
depictions of events make examples of such events more cognitively available.348
Historical illustrations make the point best.  As Cass Sunstein has noted, “with 
respect to terrorism, the attacks of 9/11 are highly salient, in a way that is likely to 
lead people to perceive a strong likelihood of a future attack or perhaps to neglect 
344 See Paul Meller, Gag Order: EU Law's Graphic Tobacco Warnings Int’l Herald Tribune 
(March 1, 2001) found at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/intltobacco/2001q1/000426.html (last 
visited, Aug. 28, 2010). 
345 See, e.g. Graphic campaigns for anti-abortionists include strategic use of vivid pictures and 
language.  See e.g., http://www.ncregister.com/blog/is_this_pro-life_ad_too_graphic/ ; 
http://www.priestsforlife.org/images/index.aspx.  See also, 
http://www.kiiitv.com/news/local/96425709.html; 
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/local/news-article.aspx?storyid=30784 (examples of vivid 
language used in a PETA campaign); http://www.nzherald.co.nz/road-
safety/news/article.cfm?c_id=308&objectid=10579763;  
http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2002/oct/texas_dwi/index.html ; 
http://www.adcouncil.org/default.aspx?id=49 (explicit wording used in a anti drunk driving 
advertisement ) (last visited, July 30, 2010). 
3 4 3  Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 81, at 1067. (noting that cascade effects caused by the 
availability heuristic can produce a public demand for regulation even though the relevant risks are 
trivial, while producing little or no demand for regulation of risks that are large in magnitude); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 241 
(1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous]; Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability 
Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 899, 
936 (“If people are mistaken about the fatalities associated with various activities, then they are 
likely to favor overexpenditure of funds to prevent damage from [less dangerous hazards] while 
underfunding efforts to reduce [more dangerous hazards], which they view as less dangerous.”); 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28  at 707; cf. Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing 
Decision Biases in Negotiation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 701 n.56 (2005) (“In some 
cases, [policymakers] may be prodded to regulate insignificant risks, and in others they may face 
apathy in promoting public health measures.”). 
347 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 66, at 1127. Other serious risks whose effects will occur 
over a long period of time and whose dangers lack vividness command less attention.  Sunstein 
has written about climate change, “No salient event heightens public concern, and indeed most 
people lack personal experience that would make the relevant risks seem immediate or even real 
as opposed to speculative and hypothetical.”  See Sunstein, American Reactions, supra note 160, 
at 507.  
348 For more on the availability heuristic, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note at 683-691; see also, 
Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 65, at 1519; see also, Jolls, supra note 68, at 270-71.; see 
also, Korobkin & Ulen, supra note , at 1091.; see also, Pidot, supra note 68, at 222-23; see also, 
Sunstein, Precautions, supra note 68, at 77.  
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the question of probability altogether, focusing instead on the worst that might 
happen.” 349  In contrast, some hazards are inconspicuous, slow to develop, and 
subtle as their approach.   An example is slow-growing cancers.350  The risk from 
such cancers is very serious, and may be statistically more devastating than other 
types of risks.351  However, because the danger is less dramatic and the effects are 
hidden, and less vivid, this type of harm is less easily brought to mind than other 
types of harms, such as tsunamis, tornados, and other dramatic weather events, 
plane crashes, and explosions.352  The latter categories of events are not only 
easier to retrieve, but they involve images that are prone to slow cognitive decay. 
353
E. The Media and Risk Perception 
What the media chooses to report has important implications for how 
members of society perceive risks.354 The infamous Love Canal situation has been 
cited as an example of the media’s powerful role in shaping public perception.355
Initially alarming reports caused widespread concern, and subsequent attempts to 
revise initial estimates of harm were ineffective in reassuring the public.356
Media players can act as risk communication facilitators in the same way that 
famous personalities and organized public interest groups can.  Moreover, so-
called availability entrepreneurs of all stripes utilize mass media outlets to spread 
their message.   
1. Constraints and Goals of the Media 
 The news media is constrained by three factors; deadlines, resource 
limitations, and geographical factors.357  At times the realities of a developing 
story and a firm deadline force journalists to file a partial story, which may not 
include all of the important details, or may not even be able to provide the most 
349 Sunstein, American Reactions, supra note 160, at 507. 
350 Carcinoid is a slow growing type of neuroendocrine tumor.  See http://www.carcinoid.org/ (last 
visited, July 29, 2010).
351  Sunstein, American Reactions, supra note 160, at 507. 
352 See List of Disasters by year, including highly publicized 2010 Oil Spill (found at: 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001437.html) (last visited, July 29, 2010).  
353 See Howard Eichenbaum, Norbert Fortin, Episodic Memory and the Hippocampus: It’s About 
Time, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 53, 53 (2003) available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20182835  (“episodic memory refers to the capacity to mentally 
reexperience a previous occasion in one’s life…[it has] a special capacity for the recollection of 
specific personal experiences…”). 
354  Altheide, supra note 13, at 664.  The role of the media as a facilitator with the power to 
influence public perceptions of risk is a vital player in the risk perception landscape. 
355 Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy of Three 
Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 463, 472-6 (2007) (Pogue gives a detailed 
description of: regulation before the love Canal incident, the incident itself, and the response to the 
incident). 
356 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at  184. 
357 See James W. Potter, MEDIA LITERACY 103 (3d ed 2005).  
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relevant details of the story, depending upon whether the bulk of the information 
is gathered after a deadline.358  Newspapers face the most difficult deadline 
constraints, while radio, television, and the internet are less affected by 
deadlines.359
As with any industry, media outlets have specific goals.  General goals for 
media include constructing audiences and maximizing profits.360   Like any other 
industry, the media seeks to make a profit361 by decreasing expenses and 
increasing revenue.362  Although advertising is the most effective method for 
increasing revenue, another strategy for increasing profit is to grow audience size 
by increasing the attractiveness of content.363 The most direct way of augment 
audience size is to adopt a marketing perspective, paying special attention to the 
types of stories that will generate the largest audiences.364  Often, unusual and 
sensational news stories draw audiences.365  Recent commentary has discussed the 
media trend toward gossip, celebrities, and sensationalistic stories.366 Story 
formulas are another influence on what gets reported. 367Time constraints lead 
reporters to resort to shortcuts, or story formulas, to generate material.368 The 
reliance on these formulas can skew or even change the way the story will be 
perceived by the public.369
358 Id. at 103.  (Potter provides an example of this situation regarding morning newspapers.  They 
typically will have a deadline the night before; therefore, any information gathered after that 
deadline cannot be included in the next morning edition of the newspaper.  The editor of the paper 
will then have to make the decision whether to include the information in the next day’s paper.  If 
she does so then the information is old news and the audience surly is already aware of it, but if 
she does not then the paper did not report the full news).    
359 Id. at 171.  
360 Id. at 180.  But see Elizabeth M. Perse, MEDIA EFFECTS AND SOCIETY 228 (2001) (“ . . . the 
goal of mass media should be to improve society, not merely to give people what they want.”)
361 David Croteau & William Hoynes, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 109 (2000). 
362 Potter, supra note 337, at 182.  
363 Id. at 124.  
364 Id. at 173.  
365 Perse, supra note 343 at 39. 
366 Kelli S. Burns, CELEB 2.0: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA FOSTER OUR FASCINATION WITH POPULAR 
CULTURE (celebrity gossip has become and accepted part of the news, with celebrity antics 
showing up in venerable mainstream media outlets . . .” ); see also, Potter, supra note 337, at 107.  
(Potter notes that people like deviance from the norm.  Because of this, the news media are more 
interested in presenting stories that are deviations than those that fall within the realm of “normal,” 
because they are considered to be more newsworthy).   
367 Id. at 191.  
368 Id.  Judges and legal practitioners have had to develop methods for dealing with the fallout 
from media soundbites and skew.  See Lieve Gies, LAW AND THE MEDIA: THE FUTURE OF AN 
UNEASY RELATIONSHIP 8 (referring to the legal system’s “extraordinary resilience and its ability to 
take on media detractors.”) 
369 Id. at 110-11.  (An example of a story formula is the series of questions: Who? What? Where? 
When? Why? and How?  Another story formula is called the inverted pyramid.  In this structure a 
journalist places the most important information at the beginning of the story and then 
progressively moves on to information of less importance). 
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2. What the Media Reports 
The media’s choice of what to report is often largely determinative of 
what receives public attention.370  Media outlets tend to report on risks that 
reporters and editors already deem to be of interest to the public.371  The initial 
determination is a key factor in determining what news reaches the public.  The 
media tends to focus on risks that kill or injure numerous people at a single time 
as opposed to risks that have a cumulative effect over a longer time span, such as 
a year. 372Routine sources of danger and common risks are less newsworthy.  
Catastrophes and unusual risks are novel and imminently sellable.373  The amount 
of time it takes for an event to unfold, or to occur, also plays an important role in 
how newsworthy a story is. 374  For example, environmental degradation such as 
worsening water quality and deforestation is less likely to make it into the news 
than a single environmental disaster, such as a tsunami, hurricane, or massive 
flooding.375 Another factor important to determining what information will make 
it into the media is whether there is a “human angle” to the story.376  Personal 
accounts are particularly likely to engage the audience. 377  News stories that 
focus on the trials of a single person are also more likely to contain salient details, 
making the story more likely to be recalled and recounted.378
 While reporters seek out compelling subject matter, story content is not 
the only consideration.  The types of sources available also influence which 
stories are reported.  The media tend to favor official sources as opposed to 
alternative sources, and engage in relatively little independent investigation to 
substantiate information from these sources, as opposed to the investigation 
conducted to verify information provided by an alternative source.379  When the 
story involves a crisis, such as a natural disaster, official sources are likely to be 
particularly favored by the media. After most of the fallout from a crisis has 
370 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 98.  
371 Edward S. Herman The Media and Markets in the United States, in THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE 
ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 66, The World Bank Institute (2002).  
372 Emma Hughes, Jenny Kitzinger, & Graham Murdock, The Media and Risk, in Risk in Social 
Science 250, 253 (Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006).   
373 Id. at 255. 
374 Id.  This immediacy bias is reflected not only in consumer preferences, but also in legislative 
responses to harms.  One example is involuntary civil commitment requirements for the mentally 
ill,which specify that prior to commitment, there must be a demonstration that due to mental 
illness, the subject is an immediate danger to self or others.  See e.g., Utah. Code Ann. § 62A-12-
234(10)(b) (2000) (indicating that the subject manifest “an immediate danger of physical injury to 
others or himself”)(emphasis added); Ala. Code § 22-52-10.4(a)(ii) (1997) (requiring proof that 
“respondent poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others.”); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 16 § 5001 (1995)(emphasis added). 
375 Id. See also, Herman, supra note 354. 
376 See Hughes et al., supra note 355, at 256.  
377 Id.  
378 Id.
379 Id. at 253. (Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006).  ; see also, Herman, supra note 
354 at 68. 
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passed, the media tend to become more critical of the sources they have used.380
Another factor influencing which sources gain access to the media is a source’s 
resources.  Greater resources allow certain sources of information to access the 
media disparately. Well-heeled sources not only gain initial access to media 
outlets, they also often outlast any opposition with fewer resources.381
The geological, cultural, or political focus of the reporter or media outlet 
also influences that which is deemed newsworthy.  Events that are of particular 
personal, cultural, or political relevance to the audience are particularly likely to 
be reported.382  Some have noted that the public’s apparent obsession with 
celebrities often influences reporting choices.  Risks that impact celebrities or 
public figures receive greater attention than they would otherwise.383  While the 
media is particularly interested in some kinds of subject matter, there are certain 
types of stories reporters are careful to avoid.  Some threats are categorized as 
unpalatable, and rarely (or gingerly) reported.  For instance, the media is much 
more likely to report the murder or sexual assault of a child when the perpetrator 
is a stranger, as opposed to a family member.384  Hence, although the incidence of 
violence against women and children is much higher at the hands of family 
members, media reports would lead to the conclusion that stranger attacks are 
more frequent.385
3. The Media as Facilitator: Social Amplification and Availability Cascades 
 When an event with negative effects occurs, it can serve as a signal, 
portending future harm. 386  However, the degree to which the event assumes 
significance for risk perception varies widely.387  The significance of a particular 
380 See Hughes, supra note 355, 254.  
381 Id. at 254.  (An example of this was silicone breast implants in the 1990’s.  At first, media 
coverage focused on health risks and testimonials from women who had complications.  As time 
passed, the leading manufacturer of breast implants, Corning, was able to take advantage of their 
resources and public relations officials.  Later coverage was then dominated by assurances by the 
industry that breast implants were safe). 
382 Id. at 256.  (An example of this occurred within the British press.  In July 2005, 52 people died 
as the result of a terrorist attack on the subway system in London.  This was discussed at length on 
television and radio, and made the front page news on many print media outlets.  In contrast, 
almost 25,000 civilians have died in Iraq between March 2003 and March 2005, but this 
information is rarely reported on within British media outlets). 
383 Id. at 257. 
384 Id.
385 Id. (Many more children are killed by the hands of their mothers or fathers each year than by 
strangers).  See Molly J. Walker Wilson, An Evolutionary Perspective on Male Violence: Practical 
and Policy Implications, 32 Am. J. of Crim. L. 291, 293 (2005). 
386 Pidgeon, supra note 59, at 146 (explaining that “ . . . as a key part of [the] communication 
process, risk events and their characteristics become portrayed through various risk signals 
(images, signs, and symbols) which in turn interact with a wide range of psychological, social, 
institutional or cultural processes in ways that intensify or attenuate perceptions of risk.”)     
387 Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96 (explaining “ . . . the human experience of risk is 
simultaneously an experience of potential harm and the ways by which institutions and people 
process and interpret these threats…risk analysis…requires an approach that is capable of 
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signal can be profoundly influenced by the degree to which it is broadcast and 
portrayed in the media.388  In this role, the media acts as an amplification station 
for the information.  There are four ways in which amplification stations may 
increase the social amplification of a risk, which are: volume, whether the 
information is disputed, the extent to which the information is dramatized, and the 
symbolic connotations to the information. 389  After information is sent out by an 
amplification station and received, it can then be amplified again resulting in 
behavioral responses creating secondary effects and possibly third-order effects.  
These are ripple effects.390
In a first-order effect, a large volume of information flow about a 
particular risk can serve to amplify the perception of risk.  In a second-order 
effect, extensive coverage of a particular event may result in increased attention 
from the public, which may, in turn, result is additional media focus.391  To the 
extent that the risk is debated, resulting uncertainty can increase public anxiety.392
Moreover, sensationalistic accounts of an event designed to increase interest, can 
serve to heighten concern.  Sensational new stories generally rely on vivid 
reenactments or recounts, which increase awareness and memory for the event 
long after initial exposure.393  Finally, symbolic language designed to heighten 
drama is commonly employed, resulting in further amplification of risk 
perception.394
 The importance of memorable and emotionally relevant stimuli for risk 
perception is critical to understanding the effect of the media in public risk 
response.395  A death from an event such as an airplane crash is 6,000 times more 
likely to be reported by the media than someone dying from cancer, although the 
risk of death from air travel is far less than the risk from cancer.396  The media 
also frequently increase coverage about events that occur with declining 
frequency, while decreasing coverage about events that are increasing in 
frequency.  For example, media coverage of salmonella poisoning incidents is 
decreasing even though the number of incidents is on the rise. 397Similarly, the 
illuminating risk in its full complexity, [and] is sensitive to the social settings in which risk 
occurs…[recognizing] that social interactions may either amplify or attenuate the signals to 
society about the risk.”) 
388 Lynn J. Frewer, Susan Miles, & Roy Marsh, The Media and Genetically Modified Foods: 
Evidence in Support of the Social Amplification of Risk, 22 Risk Analysis: An Official Publication 
of the Society for Risk Analysis, 701,702 (2002). 
389 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at  182-4 (Kasperson provides a detailed 
description of this ripple effect, in addition he provides a visual representation of this 
phenomenon).  
390 Id.(Kasperson provides a detailed description of this ripple effect, in addition he provides a 
visual representation of this phenomenon).  
391 Id.at 184.  See Also Frewer et al., supra note 371, at 702 (Frewer et al. provide contrasting 
examples of how the volume of information can influence the social amplification of risk). 
392 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 184. 
393 Id. at 184-5. 
394 Id. at 185. 
395 Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note 185, at 33-34.  
396 Hughes et al., supra note 355, at 250 
397 Id.  
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number of stories reporting on dangers posed by environmental pollutants is 
increasing, while pollution levels are declining.398  The media can mislead 
members of the public, amplifying fear about some risks, while attenuating 
concerns over other risks.399
In many ways, the media is a fitting note upon which to conclude this 
Article.  So much of the risk perception story is affected by communication 
through media channels: Internet, television, newspaper, magazines, radio.400
Although the members of the public interpret information through their own 
lenses, the manner in which the media frames the risk issue or debate 
unquestionably has enormous effects on initial evaluations, and often these effects 
are lasting. Moreover, the media is often used by non-media sources to control the 
hearts and minds of Americans.401
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the current dearth of understanding how 
individuals evaluate and assess risk is a serious problem from the perspective of 
managing risk, and public reactions to risk events.  Citizens’ views on risks are 
not often considered systematically before risk decisions are made.  Lack of 
public input is problematic because, as recent commentary has noted, resource 
allocation is never value-neutral—particularly where risk management is 
concerned.402  For example, environmental law scholar Donald Hornstein asserts 
that “the substance of modern environmental law is a composite of moral 
decisions—about the levels of protection to be accorded such noncommodity 
values as human health, aesthetics, and responsibility toward nonhuman species 
and ecosystems—and instrumental decisions about the best way to achieve these 
morally based goals.”403   All risk decisions involve judgments about the most 
appropriate way to balance benefits against costs, allocate resources, and 
distribute hazard potentials, and hence such decisions often implicate complex 
and value-laden questions about equality and fairness.404
Although there is debate about how to manage risks (and who should 
manage it), there ought not be any dispute as to the necessity of a comprehensive 
public risk perception model.  The need for a better understanding of how risk 
398 Id. at 250. 
399 Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at  182. 
400  Wahlberg & Sjöberg, supra note 127, at 31 (regardless of extent, it is undeniable that media 
does play a role in public risk perception).  
401 See Francesco Sobbrio, Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias, 1 (University of Southern 
California) (2010)(see generally for proposition that lobbyists indirectly control and bias the 
media in their favor behind the scenes). 
402 See generally, Kahan, supra note 82. 
403 See Hornstein, supra note 24 at 630-31. 
404 See e.g., Roger E. Kasperson (ed.), EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
(1983). 
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information is received and evaluated is manifest in data collected from survey 
studies on individual attitudes about risk.  Renown risk researcher Paul Slovic 
notes that 
a consistent result from psychometric studies of expressed preferences is 
that people tend to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most 
activities. The gap between perceived and desired risk levels suggests that 
people are not satisfied with the way that market and other regulatory 
mechanisms have balanced risks and benefits.”405
If risk decisions are to well serve the public, they must be crafted with some 
understanding of the needs and desires of the human-beings who are at risk.   
The mandate for getting a handle on public risk perception is so profound 
that it has served as a primary impetus for risk perception research to date.  Risk 
analysts—as members of society and the human race—have a critical role to play 
in risk policy.  However, judgments of risk analysts have limited value on their 
own.  Because experts are not outside of the cultural milieu, they, like others, are 
influenced by inevitable cognitive patterns, emotion-based responses, and 
political and moral concerns.406  Expert analysis and opinion should be informed 
by careful consideration of the preferences of lay members of the public. 
 This article draws on prior empirical and theoretical work to develop a 
comprehensive model of public risk perception that can assist risk managers and 
inspire future discussion about the role of individual citizens in risk decisions.   
Included in this analysis is not only a discussion of how the characteristics of a 
risk influence citizens’ views, but also about how perceptions of risk are 
influenced by features of the communication context, neutral and non-neutral 
communicators, characteristics of any relevant subpopulation at risk, and cultural 
factors, among other considerations. The compilation of factors presented in this 
Article is designed not only to serve as a starting point for fresh consideration of 
how hazards ought to be managed, it is also presented as a model for predicting 
public risk response.  Significant implications follow.  Public panics may be 
legitimate, or they may be more harmful than they are helpful. 407  Some 
communication campaigns may be timely and informative, others may help to 
405 Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283 (emphasis added). 
406 Baruch Fischhoff, Stephen R. Watson, & Chris Hope, Defining Risk, 17 Pol. Sci. 123-139, 124 
(1984)(“No definition (of risk) is advanced as the correct one, because there is no one definition 
that is suitable for all problems. Rather, the choice of definition is a political one, expressing 
someone's views regarding the importance of different adverse effects in a particular situation. 
Such determinations should not be the exclusive province of scientists, who have no special 
insight into what society should value.”)  
407 Dara L. Schottenfeld, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex Offenders, Oh My: Why it is 
Time to Call Off the Hunt, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359, 359 (2008) (discussion of Salem witch 
trial panic and relation to modern day “witchhunts” involving internet sex offenders); Albert M. 
Rosenblatt, Under Stress: The Constitution in Times of National Ordeal, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
143, 143 (2009) (discussing 9-11 and USA Patriot act/torture). 
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fuel a perfect storm, creating unnecessary anxiety and wasted effort.408  With 
heightened awareness of the social and cultural factors that drive risk assessment, 
lawmakers can better manage risks and address public risk responses proactively.   
408 See the D.A.R.E. as a helpful campaign, http://www.dare.com/home/default.asp (last visited 
July 7, 2010); see also, Burt the Cold War Turtle as needless and anxiety producing, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixy5FBLnh7o (last visited July 7, 2010). 
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APPENDIX: FIGURE 1—RISK PERCEPTION MODEL
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